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STRANGE BEDFELLOWS: THE UNEASY ALLIANCE
BETWEEN BANKRUPTCY AND FAMILY LAW
MICHAELA M. WHITE*

I. INTRODUCTION**
A basic understanding of bankruptcy law has become increasingly
important to those who specialize in family law if only because of the
increasing number of bankruptcy cases filed annually by individuals.
Many of these cases are filed by persons who are in the process of
obtaining a dissolution of the marriage bond, a division of marital or
community property, or custody of children. Others are filed by individuals, who, having already obtained an order of dissolution, are obliged
to provide support for a former spouse or child or to comply with the
terms of a property settlement order. In each case, important questions
of bankruptcy and family law can, and frequently do, arise.
Where the party filing bankruptcy is either in the process of obtaining
a dissolution decree or is already required to make support or property
settlement payments, the ex-spouse entitled to receive these payments,
once aware of the bankruptcy, will often first contact the attorney who
represented the ex-spouse in the dissolution proceeding. The attorney is
likely to be asked a number of questions which he or she will be unable
to answer without an understanding of the relevant principles of bankruptcy law. A list of possible questions which might be posed under these
circumstances includes:
1. May the pending dissolution action continue during the bankruptcy
case?
2. May an action be commenced or continue against an ex-spouse for
the past due support or sums due under a property settlement order?
3. Can an ex-spouse discharge the support or property settlement obligations which are past due, now due, or due in the future?
4. Will a mortgage or a security interest given to secure payment of
*Associate Professor of Law, McGeorge School of Law. J.D., Magna Cum Laude, Creighton
University School of Law, 1979; B.A. Creighton University, 1976. Assistant Attorney General,
Nebraska Department of Justice, 1983-1984; Associate, Oppenheimer, Wolff, Foster, Shepard &
Donnelly, 1980-1983; Law Clerk, Honorable Fallon Kelly, Minnesota Supreme Court, 1979-1980;
Law Clerk, Honorable Donald R. Ross, United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 19781979.
**This Article is an adaptation of a chapter written by the author to be published in C. Blakesley,
L. Wardle, and J. Parker, Family Law in the United States (1987).
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a support or property settlement obligation survive and be enforceable after bankruptcy?
This Article explores the confluence of bankruptcy and family law. It
attempts to set forth and resolve the important issues which arise when
the two bodies of law intersect in a bankruptcy proceeding. In so doing,
it examines the fundamental policies underlying the principles of both
bankruptcy and family law which conflict, perhaps inevitably, in the
context of a bankruptcy case. A general overview of three types of bankruptcy proceedings and the major events which occur in these proceedings
is first provided in an effort to set the stage for the subsequent discussion
of the automatic stay, the dischargeability of family obligations under the
Bankruptcy Code, the liability of the debtor and the debtor's property
after bankruptcy, and the debtor's ability to avoid liens granted in a
dissolution action in order to secure performance of support and property
settlement obligations. Finally, pre-bankruptcy planning suggestions are
offered in an effort to assist the attorney drafting support or property
settlement agreements.
II. AN OVERVIEW OF A BANKRUPTCY CASE
A voluntary bankruptcy case begins or is "commenced" when the
petitioner, the debtor, files a petition with the clerk of the bankruptcy
court. The petition requests relief under one of the chapters of the Bankruptcy Code.' Requesting relief simply means that the petitioner wishes
to take advantage of the protections of the Bankruptcy Code. The debtor's
filing of the petition constitutes an order for relief.2 The order for relief
will always be entered in the type of bankruptcy case that the debtor
initiated, for example, it will be identified as a Chapter 7, 13, or 11 order
for relief.3
The debtor's act of filing a bankruptcy petition triggers the creation of
a new legal entity called the bankruptcy estate. 4 The estate is comprised
of certain items of the debtor's property. The major portion of the property
of the estate consists of the petitioner's legal and equitable interests in
property as of the date the bankruptcy petition is filed. 5 In community
1. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 302. The Bankruptcy Code was enacted as part of the Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978. Pub. L. 95-598, 92 Stat. 2645 (1978). These laws are codified at 11 U.S.C. §§ 1011330 (1982). The Code was amended numerous times in 1984. Pub. L. 98-249, 98 Stat. 116; Pub.
L. 98-271, 98 Stat. 163; Pub. L. 98-299, 98 Stat. 214; Pub. L. 98-325, 98 Stat. 268; Pub. L. 98353, 98 Stat. 343; Pub. L. 98-454, 98 Stat. 1745. These amendments are codified at 11 U.S.C.
§§ 101-1330 (Supp. III 1985). In 1986 Congress again amended the Code. Pub. L. 99-554, 100
Stat. 4934. These amendments may be found at 11 U.S.C.A. §§ 101-1330 (West. Supp. 1987) or
11 U.S.C.S. §§ 101-1330 (Law. Co-op. 1987).
2. 11 U.S.C. §§301, 302.
3. Id.
4. Id. §541.
5. Id. §541(a)(1).
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property jurisdictions, the estate also includes all community property in
which the debtor has sole, equal, or joint management and control. 6
Whether wages earned by the debtor after the bankruptcy case is commenced, and other property acquired after the bankruptcy petition has
been filed, are treated as property of the estate depends, in part, on under
which chapter the debtor has sought relief. For example, in a Chapter 7
liquidation case, as well as in a Chapter 11 business reorganization proceeding, post-petition wages are not considered to be property of the
estate. 7 The same is true of nearly all other property acquired by the
debtor after the petition has been filed.' In contrast, however, wages
earned and property acquired after the case is commenced are deemed to
be property of the estate in a Chapter 13 proceeding. 9
One of the most important immediate effects of filing a bankruptcy
case is the imposition of an automatic stay against all of the petitioner's
creditors.° This means that creditors are automatically restrained from
any act or proceeding to collect a pre-petition claim against the debtor,
the debtor's property, or property of the estate. 1'
The debtor's filing of a Chapter 7 bankruptcy petition is also the
triggering event which directs the bankruptcy court to appoint a trustee."
The trustee's main obligation is to take possession of the property of the
estate, sell it, and then to distribute the proceeds to the debtor's general
unsecured creditors.' 3 If a creditor has a property interest, a lien, in an
item that the trustee wishes to sell, the trustee generally must pay the
lien holder in full before any amounts will be paid to unsecured creditors. 14
Typically, the value of an asset does not exceed or will only slightly
exceed the value of the liens against it. As a result, the trustee will often
decide to relinquish any claim to the asset. This is known as abandoning
the asset. 15

Along with the bankruptcy petition, the debtor files schedules which
list all of the debtor's assets and liabilities,' 6 as well as property exempt
from the claims of creditors. '"The right to claim property as exempt is
6. Id. §541(a)(2)(A).
7. Id.§§541(a)(1), 541(a)(6).
8. For exceptions to this general rule, see 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(5), which governs the circumstances
under which certain post-petition assets become part of the estate. See also II U.S.C. §541(a)(6),
which generally states that post-petition rents or profits from property of the estate will also be
considered part of the bankruptcy estate.
9. Id.§ 1306(a)(2).
10. Id.§362(a).
11. Id.§ 362(a)(l)-(a)(3).
12. Id. §§701, 702.
13. Id. §704.
14. Id.§H506, 554, 726.
15. Id. §554.
16. Id. §521; Bankruptcy Rule 1007 (Supp. 1983).
17. Id. §521; Bankruptcy Rules 1007, 4003 (Supp. 1983).
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governed by the Code,'" and if the debtor is successful in utilizing an
exemption, this will have the effect of immunizing particular items of
property from the claims of most creditors during pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding as well as after the case is closed. 9
In a Chapter 13 case, the debtor also files a repayment plan in addition
to schedules itemizing assets, liabilities, and exempt property. 20 The Chapter 13 plan is a statement proposing how full or partial payment of the
debtor's pre-petition debts will be achieved. Typically, the debtor proposes that the source of plan payments will be from the debtor's postpetition earnings, which are property of the estate."' After a hearing in
which creditors are given an opportunity to raise objections,2 2 the court
decides whether to approve or confirm the plan.2 3 If a plan is confirmed,
it is binding on all the debtor's creditors whether or not they consented
to the plan.24
Although generally more complicated than a Chapter 13 case, a Chapter
11 proceeding shares many similar characteristics. For example, as in a
Chapter 13 case, the Chapter 11 debtor also files a plan proposing full
or partial repayment of pre-petition debts.25 However, unlike a Chapter
13 case, an election is held in which creditors are given the opportunity
to vote for or against the plan.2 6 If the requisite number of votes are
obtained in favor of the plan,27 and other statutory criteria are met, 28 the
court will approve or confirm the plan following a hearing in which
creditors may object to the plan's provisions.29 After the plan's confirmation, all creditors holding claims which are provided for by the plan
are bound by it even though they did not vote in favor of the plan.3"
The requirement that a plan be filed in a Chapter 13 or 11 case is
closely related to the underlying purpose of Chapter 13 or 11 bankruptcy
cases. Typically, a debtor utilizing these chapter proceedings, rather than
a Chapter 7 (straight bankruptcy) proceeding, intends to repay creditors
over a period of time. In contrast, the primary objective of the debtor in
a Chapter 7 proceeding is to forever enjoin creditors from taking any
steps to collect the debt as a personal liability of the debtor. The peti18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. §522.
Id. § 522(c).
Id. § 1322; Bankruptcy Rule 3015 (Supp. 1983).
Id. § 1306(a)(2).
Id. § 1324.
Id.§§ 1324, 1325.
Id.§ 1327(a).
Id.§§1121, 1123.
Id.§ 1126.
Id.§§ 1126(c), (d).
Id.§ 1129.
Id.§ 1128(b).
Id.§ 1141(a).
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tioner's discharge of a debt within a Chapter 7 bankruptcy therefore
prevents the creditor from collecting any pre-petition debt as a personal
liability of the debtor. 3'
Thus, two of three fundamental purposes of American bankruptcy law
are served in a Chapter 7 case. The first, that of providing the honest
and financially embarrassed debtor with a fresh start, is accomplished
principally through the grant of a discharge.32 The second, that of providing an equitable basis for the division of the debtor's assets to creditors,
is realized through the mechanisms of the automatic stay, the trustee's
avoiding powers, and the Bankruptcy Code's priority and distribution
schemes.33
Some Chapter 7 debtors are disappointed to learn that not all of their
debts are subject to discharge in bankruptcy. Many debts are not dischargeable simply because of the wrongful manner in which the obligation
was incurred. The classic example of this type of nondischargeable debt
would be one which arose as a result of fraud.34 Others, such as obligations
for alimony, maintenance, or spousal, or child support will not be discharged for reasons of public policy.35 The practical effect of a nondischargeable debt is that the debtor's personal liability survives bankruptcy.
A creditor to whom a nondischargeable debt is owed will eventually be
pursue a personal claim against the debtor in an effort to collect
allowed to
36
the debt.

Even if all of the debtor's obligations are dischargeable, in certain
instances, the debtor nonetheless may not receive the benefits of a general
discharge of debts. 37 For example, a general discharge can be denied due
to serious misconduct by the debtor either before or during the Chapter
7 proceeding.3 8 If this occurs, then even those debts that would normally
be considered dischargeable will survive bankruptcy, and the claimants
will eventually be allowed to pursue the debtor and the debtor's property
for payment of the obligations.39
Unlike the case of a debtor who files a Chapter 7 bankruptcy case, the
debtor's principal motivation in filing a Chapter 13 or 11 case is not
necessarily to obtain a discharge. If the debtor intends to repay creditors
31. Id. § 524(a). However, it is important to note that the discharge of an obligation does not
prevent a creditor with a valid lien in the debtor's property from proceeding against the property
subject to the lien. Before the creditor can initiate an in rem procedure, however, steps to have the
automatic stay lifted must be taken unless it has already expired. Id. 88 362, 506.
32. J. WHrE, BANKRUPTCY AND CREDITORS' RIGHTS 29 (1985).
33. Id. at 30.
34. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(2)(A)-(B).
35. Id. § 523(a)(5).
36. Id. §§523, 524, 727(b).
37. Id. § 727.
38. Id. § 727(a).
39. Id. §§524, 727.
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in full over a period of time, there will be no need to seek a discharge
of these debts. In this instance, the debtor seeks the protection of the
provisions of Chapter 13 or 11 in order to bind even nonconsenting
creditors to the plan, and to prevent them from utilizing any state-based
collection remedies while the debtor makes the payments called for by
the plan." If, however, the debtor proposes less than full payment to
creditors, the debtor's motivation in filing a Chapter 13 or 11 petition is,
at least in part, to obtain a discharge. 4 Thus, the third principal purpose
of American bankruptcy law, that of rehabilitating a financially troubled
debtor, is served through the device of Chapter 13 or 11 repayment plans.42
After the debtor obtains or is denied a discharge, or the case is closed
or dismissed, whichever occurs first, the automatic stay expires. "3 A
Chapter 7 case will be closed only after the trustee has distributed the
proceeds of the debtor's nonexempt assets, if any, and made a full report
to the bankruptcy court." This usually occurs after the debtor has been
either granted or denied a discharge. Once the stay has expired or has
been terminated,4" unsecured creditors whose debts have not been discharged may now pursue a personal claim against the debtor,46 but are
not allowed to proceed against property that has been exempted in the
bankruptcy proceeding.4 7 There is an important exception to this rule,
however. Creditors holding unsecured claims for alimony, maintenance,
spousal or child support may utilize state collection remedies to reach
property exempted in the bankruptcy case for payment of their claims.48
III. PROPERTY OF THE ESTATE
A new entity called the estate is created when a bankruptcy case is
filed. The bankruptcy estate consists of certain assets of the debtor which
are called collectively property of the estate.
40. Id. §§362, 1327.
41. There are two types of Chapter 13 discharges: a "general" and a "hardship" discharge. Id.
§ 1328(a)-(b). The only requirement for a general discharge is that the debtor successfully complete
the plan payments. A Chapter 13 general discharge is broader than a Chapter 7 discharge, because
with respect to the former, only debts for alimony, maintenance, spousal, and child support are
considered nondischargeable. Id. § 1328(a). Under certain circumstances, a Chapter 13 "hardship"
discharge is available even though the debtor was not able to complete the payments proposed by
the plan. Id. § 1328(b). However, unlike a Chapter 13 general discharge, a hardship discharge will
not extinguish any obligations which are not subject to discharge in a Chapter 7 proceeding. Id.
§ 1328(c). Likewise, a Chapter 11 discharge does not extend to any debts that an individual could
not discharge in a Chapter 7 liquidation. Id. § 1141(d).
42. WHrrE, supra note 32, at 30.
43. 11 U.S.C. §362(c).
44. Id. § 704; Bankruptcy Rule 3009 (Supp. 1983).
45. Id. § 362(c)-(d).
46. Id. §§ 523, 524.
47. Id. § 522(c).
48. Id. §522(c)(1).
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An understanding of the bankruptcy concept of property of the estate
is important because it defines, in part, the scope of the automatic stay"
and a particularly important exception to the stay for family law lawyers."
Furthermore, it is the assets which are property of the estate that the
debtor attempts to immunize from the obligations owed creditors by
claiming the assets as exempt. The Chapter 7 trustee then sells the remaining assets in the estate, if any, and distributes the proceeds to creditors.
Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that the commencement
of a bankruptcy case5" creates an estate. The bulk of this estate is comprised of all legal and equitable interests of the debtor in property as of
the commencement of the bankruptcy proceeding.52 All property of the
debtor as of the commencement of the case, wherever located, whether
tangible or intangible, is property of the estate." Thus, if the debtor's
interest in such assets as real estate, 54 personal property,5" causes of
action," contract rights,57 tax refunds, 58 or trusts" exists, on the date the
case is commenced, it is property of the estate.
Section 541 is broader than its predecessor under the Bankruptcy Act."
It is no longer necessary that nonbankruptcy law permit the debtor's
creditors to reach the property or that the debtor be able to transfer the
49. See infra notes 78-166 and accompanying text for a discussion of the automatic stay in
bankruptcy.
50. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(2). Acts to collect alimony, maintenance, or support from property that
is not property of the estate are not automatically stayed. See infra notes 10 1-24 and accompanying
text for a discussion of this exception to the automatic stay.
51. Voluntary and involuntary bankruptcy cases are commenced by the filing of a bankruptcy
petition. 11 U.S.C. §§301-303.
52. Id.§541(a)(1).
53. Missouri v. United States Bankruptcy Court, 647 F.2d 768 (8th Cir. 1981) (the interest of
debtor grain warehouse operators-in grain stored in their warehouse was property of the estate), cert.
denied; 454 U.S. 1162; In re Golden Plan of Cal., Inc., 37 Bankr. 167 (Bankr. E.D. Cal. 1984)
(debtor's corporate name was property of the estate).
54. In re Presidential Row, Inc., 37 Bankr. I (Bankr. D. S.C. 1983) (real estate was property
of estate).
55. In re Gunder, 8 Bankr. 390 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980)'(automobile titled in father's name was
nevertheless property of son's estate).
56. In re Smith, 640 F.2d 888 (7th Cir. 1981) (cause of action for truth-in-lending violation was
property of estate).
57. In re Scanlon, 10 Bankr. 245 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1981) (debtor's contingent contract right to
a real estate commission was property of estate).
58. In re Rash, 22 Bankr. 323 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1982) (percentage of income tax return attributable
to prepetition labor was property of estate).
59. In re Dias, 37 Bankr. 584 (Bankr. D. Idaho 1984) (debtor's contingent right to receive a
share of trust was property of the estate).
60. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 367, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6322; S.REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5868. The predecessor of I I U.S.C. § 541 under the Act was § 70a, 30 Stat.
565 (repealed 1979).
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property for it to be considered property of the estate. 6 However, the
estate acquires only the legal or equitable interest held by the debtor.
Thus, if the debtor's interest in property is limited, so also is the interest
of the estate. 62
In Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 cases, the debtor's wages and earnings
from services performed after the case is filed are not property of the
estate.6 3 However, the debtor's post-petition wages and earnings are property of the estate in a Chapter 13 case at least until confirmation of a
repayment plan.64 Unless the plan or order of confirmation provides otherwise, "the confirmation of a plan vests all of the property of the estate
in the debtor." 65 As a result, post-petition property and wages which are
not devoted to the plan or submitted to the control and supervision of the
trustee as necessary for the execution of the plan do not constitute property
of the estate. 66
In community property jurisdictions, the estate includes not only the
debtor's interest in community property but also the non-filing spouse's
61. 11U.S.C. § 541(c)(1)(A); In re Goff, 706 F.2d 574, 578 n. 9 (5th Cir. 1983) (Keogh retirement
funds held to be property of estate despite restrictions on transfer); Regan v. Ross, 691 F.2d 81 (2nd
Cir. 1982) (retirement funds held to be property of estate despite limits on assignment and attachment
of proceeds under New York law). But see Warren v. G.M. Scott & Sons, 34 Bankr. 543 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1983) (Keogh plans held not to be property of estate).
Under section 70a(5) of the Bankruptcy Act, the trustee was vested with the debtor's title, as of
the filing of the petition, to "property, including rights of action, which prior to the filing of the
petition he could by any means have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold
under judicial process against him, or otherwise seized, impounded or sequestered.
Section
70a(5), 30 Stat. 565, 565-6 (repealed 1979).
62. 11 U.S.C. §541(d); Matter of Depoy, 29 Bankr. 466 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1983) (termination
of lease prior to bankruptcy left debtor with no interest in the lease for his estate to assume at the
time bankruptcy was filed). See also Warren, 34 Bankr. 543 (debtor's interest in profit-sharing
pension plan not part of bankruptcy estate because it was subject to alienation restrictions enforceable
against general creditors and, therefore, also enforceable against bankruptcy trustee).
63. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); In re Fitzsimmons, 725 F.2d 1208 (9th Cir. 1984) (earnings generated
by services performed personally by Chapter 11 debtor were excepted from property of the estate,
but all other earnings from debtor's law practice attributable to invested capital and good will were
included); In re Summerlin, 26 Bankr. 875, 877-78 (Bankr. E.D.N.C. 1983) (Chapter 11debtor's
postpetition wages were not property of the estate and thus were subject to ex-spouse's alimony
collection efforts).
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2); In re Denn, 37 Bankr. 33 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1983) (garnishment of
debtor's postpetition wages violated stay because Chapter 13 plan vested postpetition wages in the
estate).
65. 11 U.S.C. § 1327(b).
66. Denn, 37 Bankr. 33 (Chapter 13 plan vested debtor's post-petition wages in the bankruptcy
estate; these wages were protected by the automatic stay from past due child support collection
efforts); In re Sak, 21 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. E.D. N.Y. 1982) (confirmation of Chapter 13 plan vested
all property not provided for in the plan in the debtor); In re Adams, 12 Bankr. 540 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1981) (upon confirmation of Chapter 13 plan former spouse permitted to proceed against
debtor's wages for alimony in the amount the wages exceeded payments required under the plan
and against any property not being used to fund the plan or which was not necessary to the execution
of the plan).
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interest in that community property.67 The estate is also comprised of
property recovered by the trustee under certain circumstances ,68 any interest in property that the estate acquires after the case is filed, and
proceeds, product, offspring, rents, or profits of or from property of the
estate. 69 Finally, the estate includes property interests acquired by the
debtor within 180 days after the commencement of the case by bequest,
devise or inheritance,7" as a beneficiary of a life insurance policy or death
benefit plan,71 and as a result of a property settlement agreement with
the debtor's spouse, or of an interlocutory or final divorce decree.7"
The bankruptcy estate includes all property of the debtor, including
those assets the debtor wishes to exempt.73 The debtor thus exempts
property from the property of the estate.74 If the debtor fails to claim
these exemptions in a Chapter 7 case, all property of the estate will be
available for distribution by the trustee to the debtor's creditors.75
In the determination of what is property of the estate, the state law
67. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(2); In re Teel, 34 Bankr. 762 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (community property
of both debtor and his spouse was property of the estate and, therefore, within exclusive jurisdiction
of bankruptcy court thereby precluding state court division of marital property pursuant to dissolution
proceedings until the close of the bankruptcy case); In re Jeffery, 2 Bankr. 197 (Bankr. S.D. Tex.
1980) (where joint obligations of debtor and his wife were sought to be discharged, all community
property was subject to liability for debts to be discharged).
68. 11 U.S.C. §541(a)(3), (4).
69. Id. §541(a)(6), (7).
70. Id. §541(a)(5)(A); In re Means, 16 Bankr. 775 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (real estate of
debtor's father became part of bankruptcy estate where father died intestate within 180 days after
petition for bankruptcy filed).
71. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(C); In re Howland, 27 Bankr. 896 (Bankr. D. Md. 1983) (life insurance
proceeds received by the debtor as a result of her husband's death were included in property of the
estate because they were acquired within 180 days after bankruptcy filed).
72. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(5)(B).
73. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 367-68, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &
ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6322; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 82-83, reprinted in 1978 U.S.
CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5868; Tignor v. Parkinson, 729 F.2d 977 (4th Cir. 1984) (debtor's
personal injury claims, whether unliquidated when the petition was filed or settled during bankruptcy,
were property of the estate as of the commencement of the case). Under the Bankruptcy Act property
of the estate did not include exempt property. Lockwood v. Exchange Bank, 190 U.S. 294 (1903).
74. Warren, 34 Bankr. 543 (debtor's interest in profit-sharing pension plan was eligible for
exemption from the estate); In re Lowe, 25 Bankr. 86 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1982) (debtor could not
exempt I.R.A.s because at the time bankruptcy filed he did not request an exemption and at that
time he was not entitled to payments from the funds in the account); In re Gagnard, 17 Bankr. 811
(Bankr. W.D. La. 1982) (washer, dryer, and air conditioner were initially property of the estate but
once exemption upheld they became property of the debtor); In re Walters, 14 Bankr. 92 (Bankr.
S.D. W. Va. 1981) (unmatured life insurance policy on life of debtor's son claimed as exempt).
75. 11 U.S.C. §§ 704(1), 726; Matter of Cipa, I I Bankr. 968 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (debtor's
property remains property of the bankruptcy estate unless claimed as exempt). In a Chapter 11 or
Chapter 13 case, unlike a case under Chapter 7, an individual debtor usually remains in possession
of all property of the estate, including exempt property, and attempts to formulate a plan in which
the creditors are paid in full or in part from future income. Property of the estate generally is not
liquidated to satisfy the creditors' claims. I1 U.S.C. §§ 1107, 1108, 1121-1129, 1141, 1303, 1304,
1321-1325; In re Estus, 695 F.2d 311 (8th Cir. 1982).

NEW MEXICO LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 17

label of an item as property is not controlling. 76 However, the Bankruptcy
Code does give weight to the state law determination of the nature, extent
and other relevant attributes of an asset.77

IV. THE AUTOMATIC STAY
One of the most important effects of the filing of a bankruptcy petition
is the automatic imposition of a stay against virtually all creditor activity
directed at the debtor. 7' The purposes of the automatic stay are to provide
a breathing space in which the financially troubled debtor may attempt
to formulate a repayment or reorganization plan and to relieve him of the
pressures which drove the debtor into bankruptcy. It also protects creditors
from piecemeal dismemberment of the assets available to satisfy their
claims. 79
Thus, the commencement or continuation of all actions and proceedings
which were pending against the debtor at the time of filing, those which
could have been commenced against the debtor before filing, or those to
enforce, collect, or recover a pre-petition claim or judgment against the
debtor are automatically stayed upon the filing of the petition. 0 The
automatic stay prohibits any act to create, perfect, or enforce liens based
on pre-petition claims against the debtor's property. 8 Property of the
debtor's estate82 is similarly shielded from the enforcement of pre-petition
judgments and any acts to obtain possession or exercise control over it. 3
Furthermore, the stay prevents certain acts to create, perfect, or enforce
76. In re Matto's, Inc., 9 Bankr. 89 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1981) (state court's determination as to
whether liquor license was "property" was not controlling in bankruptcy court because the Code
makes it clear that licenses become property of the estate).
77. Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979) (mortgagee's interest in rents and profits
earned by property in bankruptcy estate defined by state law); Golden Plan, 37 Bankr. 167 (corporate
name was an interest to be defined by state law); In re Langley, 30 Bankr. 595 (Bankr. N.D. Ind.
1983) (debtor's interest in land trust was to be determined at the time of filing for bankruptcy by
looking to state law); In re Graham, 24 Bankr. 305 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1982) (non-bankruptcy law
defines debtor's interest in proceeds of pension and profit-sharing fund and bankruptcy law determines
whether that interest passed to the trustee as property of the bankruptcy estate), aff'd, 726 F.2d 1268
(8th Cir. 1984); Gunder, 8 Bankr. 390 (state statute on presumption of ownership not applied by
bankruptcy court).
78. One authority has summarized the effects of the automatic stay as follows: "In short, upon
the filing of the petition the creditor may continue to eat, sleep and breath; perhaps he can smile at
the debtor, but he may do little else." WHITE, supra note 32, at 97.
79. H. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 340-44, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 6296-301.
80. 11 U.S.C. §362(a)(1), (2), (6).
81. Id. §362(a)(5), (7).
82. See supra notes 49-77 and accompanying text for a discussion of property of the estate.

83. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(2)-(3).
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liens based on either pre-petition or post-petition claims against property
of the estate."
The automatic stay imposed on the above actions, proceedings, and
acts is effective immediately upon the filing of the bankruptcy petition
and before informal or formal notice is received by any entity affected
by the stay. 5 Orders, judgments, or acts in violation of the stay are
generally held to be void.86
There are eleven important statutory limitations on the scope of the
automatic stay.87 Only the two exceptions relevant to the purposes of this
Article are discussed.
A. CriminalActions and Proceedings
The automatic stay"8 is the most immediate and one of the most important protections provided to the debtor when the bankruptcy petition
is filed. However, the protective shield of the automatic stay does not
extend to the commencement or continuation of criminal proceedings
against the debtor.8 9 "The bankruptcy laws are not a haven for criminal
offenders but are designed to give relief from financial over-extension.
Thus, criminal actions and proceedings may proceed in spite of the bankruptcy."' However, when a criminal action involves the collection of an
obligation of the debtor, such as in a criminal nonsupport action, the
fresh start policy of bankruptcy and the public's interest in enforcing these
criminal laws can conflict.
Many bankruptcy courts have held and continue to hold that the court
has the equitable power 9 to enjoin the parties to a criminal action relating
84. Id. § 362(a)(4). Section 362(b)(3) narrows the scope of the stay against postpetition lien
perfection and allows such perfection when it would be effective against the trustee under section
546(b) through timely notice or within the ten day period provided for in section 547(e)(2)(A). See
also Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 1, 17-21
(1978).
85. In re Elder, 12 Bankr. 491, 495 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981) (garnishment of debtor's wages
after bankruptcy violated automatic stay and was void even though done without actual knowledge
of the stay).
86. For a discussion of the consequences of violating the automatic stay see infra notes 141-55
and accompanying text.
87. 11 U.S.C. §362(b).
88. Id. § 362(a).
89. Id. § 362(b)(1).
90. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6299; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEws 5787, 5837. The criminal proceedings exception to the automatic stay is based on
the doctrine that a federal court should not interfere with the prosecution of criminal matters within
the jurisdiction of the state court vested with their administration. See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S.
37 (1971).
91. 11 U.S.C. § 105(a) provides in part that "[tihe court may issue any order, process or judgment
that is necessary or appropriate to carry out the provisions of this title [II]."
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to the writing of bad checks from proceeding if the principal motive in
prosecuting the debtor is to collect the debt.92 These courts broadly interpret the situations in which a court's injunctive power may be exercised
in order to protect the debtor's interest in a fresh start.93
In contrast, the Third' and Eleventh95 Circuits apply a more stringent
standard to determine when a court's injunctive power may be exercised
to enjoin such criminal actions. Because there is a fundamental policy
against federal interference with state criminal prosecutions, these courts
will not enjoin parties to a state court criminal action, unless there is a
great and immediate danger of irreparable harm which constitutes a threat
to a federally protected right.96
92. In re Whitaker, 16 Bankr. 917 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1982) (criminal prosecution for violation
of bad check law enjoined because the District Attorney's motive was to recover a discharged debt);
In re Kaping, 13 Bankr. 621 (Bankr. D. Or. 1981) (the court permanently enjoined the State of
Oregon from prosecuting a debtor in a criminal nonsupport action because it was instituted primarily
to collect a dischargeable debt rather than to "vindicate the rights of the public" or to "discourage
such criminal conduct by others"); In re Lake, 11 Bankr. 202 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (state
permanently enjoined from continuing criminal prosecution for violation of bad check law because
the action was instituted solely to collect a debt); In re Caldwell, 5 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. W.D. Va.
1980) (where creditor instituted criminal action as a means of extracting a preference not accorded
other creditors similarly situated rather than merely to aid the prosecutor in punishing violations of
the criminal law, creditor's participation in prosecution was enjoined); In re Trail West, Inc., 17
Bankr 330 (Bankr. D.S.D. 1982) (criminal prosecution not enjoined because the state was not using
the criminal complaint to collect a debt by coercion or duress). See also In re Wagner, 18 Bankr.
339 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1982) (debtor not entitled to an injunction curtailing criminal prosecution
because he failed to prove the prosecution's motive was to collect a debt); In re Brown, 39 Bankr.
820 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984) (district attorney may be enjoined from seeking to revoke debtor's
probation for debtor's failure to pay restitution stemming from criminal offense). Contra In re Taylor,
44 Bankr. 548 (Bankr. D. Md. 1984) (bankruptcy court could not permanently enjoin state prosecution
of a debtor for allegedly passing bad checks even though the principal motivation behind such
prosecution was the collection of a civil debt). Many of the decisions in which a criminal action or
parties to the action have been enjoined emphasize the dischargeable nature of a prepetition debt as
partial justification for the issuance of an injunction against the parties to the criminal action. Such
motives undoubtedly thwart the "fresh start" policy of the Code. This rationale implies that if the
principal motive in the prosecution of a criminal action is to collect a nondischargeable debt, the
debtor's case for the issuance of the injunction is considerably weakened. Since, with only one
exception, Section 362(a) stays any action on and any efforts to collect dischargeable as well as
nondischargeable debts, and because, with only two exceptions, nondischargeable debts may not be
enforced against exempt property, the dischargeability status of the debt should not be controlling
in determining whether an injunction should issue. I I U.S.C. §§ 362(a)(I),(2),(6), 522(c) (1982).
Kennedy, supra note 84, at 25 (1978).
93. See supra note 92.
94. In re Davis, 691 F.2d 176, 179 (3d Cir. 1982) (the court rejected the principal motive test,
applying the Younger standard instead, and found that the debtor would not suffer irreparable injury
if an injunction was denied).
95. Barnette v. Evans, 673 F2d 1250 (11th Cir. 1982) (the court applied the Younger standard
and found that there was no great and immediate danger of injury nor was the injunction necessary
to preserve a federally protected right).
96. This standard was articulated by the Supreme Court in a nonbankruptcy case captioned Younger
v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37.
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Under either approach, the automatic stay does not prevent the prosecution of a criminal action,97 the imposition of a sentence,"8 the collection
of the debt" nor the collection of a fine"°° where the criminal action only
collaterally involves the collection of an obligation of the debtor. Only
in relatively rare cases, then, will the lawyer prosecuting a criminal
nonsupport action be prevented from commencing or continuing the action
due to the filing of a bankruptcy petition by the defendant.
B. The Collection of Alimony, Maintenance, and Support
The purpose of this section is to explore the effect of the filing of a
bankruptcy petition on collection activity designed to satisfy the debtor's
outstanding obligations for alimony, maintenance, and support. The filing
of a bankruptcy petition does not automatically stay the "collection of
alimony, maintenance, or support from property that is not property of
the estate."' In order to delineate precisely the boundaries of this exception to the automatic stay, familiarity with judicial interpretations of
the word "collection" as well as the concept of property of the estate is
necessary.
Congress's choice of the word "collection" in section 362(b)(2) should
be compared to its choice of words in other subsections setting forth other
exceptions to the automatic stay. 01 2 Section 362(b)(2) has been interpreted
to except only actions and proceedings to enforce monetary obligations
for support, alimony, and maintenance evidenced by an order or judgment
for child support or spousal support entered before the bankruptcy case
97. United States v. Troxler Hosiery Co, Inc., 41 Bankr. 457 (D. N.C. 1984) (criminal contempt
actions are not stayed); Barnette, 673 F.2d 1250 (criminal action for theft by deception, arising out
of worthless checks, was not stayed); In re Lare, 24 Bankr. 959 (D. Md. 1982) (criminal action for
acting as a contractor without a license was not stayed); In re C.H. Stuart, Inc., 12 Bankr. 85 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1981) (criminal action for theft of services was not stayed).
98. In re Wise, 25 Bankr. 440 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1982) (suspended sentence conditioned on
repayment of back taxes revoked when debtor failed to pay); Contemporary Plumbing, Inc. v. North
Carolina, 16 Bankr. 479 (E.D. N.C. 1981) (debtor's sentence of 10 days imprisonment for violation
of bad check laws not stayed).
99. In re Magnifico, 21 Bankr. 800 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982) (criminal restitution not discharged
where instituted for the purpose of rehabilitation and not debt collection); Davis, 15 Bankr. 442
(criminal restitution for amounts due on worthless checks was not subject to stay), affid, 18 Bankr.
701 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982).
100. Troxer Hosiery, 41 Bankr. 457 (collection of a fine for criminal contempt was not stayed).
101. II U.S.C. §362(b)(2).
102. See, e.g., id. § 362(b)(1) ("commencement or continuation of a criminal action or proceeding" is not stayed under any subsection of section 362(a)); Id. § 362(b)(4) (1982) ("commencement or continuation" of the action by a governmental unit to enforce its police or regulatory power
is not stayed under section 362(a)(1); Id. § 362(b)(5) (the "enforcement of a judgment, other than
a money judgment, obtained in an action . . . by a governmental unit to enforce . . . [its] police or

regulatory power" is not stayed under § 362(a)(2); Id. § 362(b)(9) ("the issuance to the debtor by
a governmental unit of a notice of tax deficiency" is not stayed under Section 362(b)(9)).
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is filed.'o 3 Under this view, all other family law actions such as dissolution
proceedings,"o actions in which an award of support, alimony, or maintenance is sought,'O° or actions in which the parties seek a division of
marital property l°" are stayed.
The property from which support, alimony, and maintenance may be
collected without interference from the automatic stay is limited to property "that is not property of the estate. "'07 Recall that when a bankruptcy
case is filed, an estate is created"°8 consisting of all property in which the
debtor has a legal or equitable interest as of the commencement of the
case." Recall further that in Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings, wages earned by an individual debtor for services performed
after the commencement of the case are not property of the estate. " °
However, in a Chapter 13 wage-earner proceeding, post-petition wages
are property of the estate at least until the plan is confirmed."' In addition,
103. In re Murray, 31 Bankr. 499, 501 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983) (stay must be modified in order
to permit debtor's wife to obtain an adjudication of the right to alimony and child support before
section 362(b)(2) exception applies); In re Garrison, 5 Bankr. 256, 260-61 (Bankr. E.D. Mich.
1980) (state court decree fixing alimony and child support must precede bankruptcy court confirmation
of a plan); Amonte v. Amonte, 17 Mass. App. 621, 461 N.E.2d 826, 830 (1984) ("collection"
applies to proceedings and actions to collect domestic obligations where a final judgment adjudicating
the obligation was entered prior to the filing of bankruptcy). Contra In re Lovett, 6 Bankr. 270,
272 (Bankr. D. Utah 1980) (entry of a state court judgment for delinquent child support after
bankruptcy filing was not stayed). See Kennedy supra note 92, at 25-26, in which the author notes
that the automatic stay rules applicable to "straight" bankruptcies under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
did not stay the "commencement or continuation of any action, or the enforcement of any judgment"
for alimony, maintenance, and support of wife and child.
104. See infra notes 125-26 and accompanying text.
105. See infra notes 127-28 and accompanying text.
106. See infra note 129 and accompanying text.
107. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(2).
108. Id. § 541(a).
109. Id. § 541. Property of the estate also includes the debtor's interest and, under certain circumstances, the interest of the debtor's spouse in community property; property recovered by the
trustee; interests in property recovered by the trustee or preserved for the benefit of the estate; certain
property acquired within 180 days after the filing of the petition; proceeds, rents, and profit from
property of the estate; and any interest in property that the estate acquires after the commencement
of the case. Id. § 541(a)(2)-(7). For a detailed discussion of property of the estate see supra notes
49-77 and accompanying text.
110. 11 U.S.C. § 541(a)(6); Summerlin, 26 Bankr. at 877-78 (Chapter 11 debtor's earnings from
services after commencement of the bankruptcy case were not property of the estate and thus were
subject to alimony claims). But see In re Sundale Associates, Ltd., 23 Bankr. 230, 232 (S.D. Fla.
1982) (real estate acquired by Chapter 11 debtor after bankruptcy case commenced is property of
the estate upon his acquisition and is protected by the automatic stay).
111. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(2); Denn, 37 Bankr. at 35 (Chapter 13 debtor's post-petition wages
were protected by automatic stay from court order for mandatory income withholding to collect
delinquent child support payments); In re Moore, 22 Bankr. 200, 201-02 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982)
(debtor's wife could not force liquidation of debtor's assets or seizure of his property, including his
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all other property specified in section 541(a) acquired by a Chapter 13
debtor after the case is commenced is property of the estate at least until
the plan is confirmed." 2
Thus, a Chapter 7 and Chapter 11 debtor's post-petition wages and
property acquired therefrom may be garnished or attached to satisfy alimony, support, or maintenance obligations without violating the automatic
stay. But, at least until confirmation of a plan, a Chapter 13 debtor's
post-petition wages and property may not be used to satisfy such claims
without permission of the bankruptcy court and an order lifting the automatic stay. "3
Property exempted in a bankruptcy proceeding is property of the debtor
and is not property of the estate; it may thus be reached by an alimony,
support, or maintenance claimant without violating the stay."1 4 However,
future earnings, to satisfy past due alimony and support obligations because his Chapter 13 plan had
not yet been confirmed); Sak, 21 Bankr. at 307 (upon the commencement of a Chapter 13 case, an
estate is created consisting of property the debtor then owns or later acquires or earns up until the
case is closed, dismissed, or converted into a Chapter 7 case); Adams, 12 Bankr. at 541-42 (exspouse did not have an absolute right to garnish Chapter 13 debtor's wages in order to collect alimony
and support until confirmation of a plan); In re Lanham, 13 Bankr. 45 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 1981)
(automatic stay prohibited Chapter 13 debtor's ex-wife from collecting child support arrearages
because the state court order was entered after the filing of the Chapter 13 petition and, as a result,
could not be enforced against any assets of the estate). But see Garrison, 5 Bankr. 256 (institution
of Chapter 13 proceeding does not stay enforcement of alimony or child support in cases in which
the state court's decree setting the support precedes the confirmation).
112. 11 U.S.C. § 1306(a)(1).
113. Adams, 12 Bankr. at 542 (on confirmation of Chapter 13 plan, all wages and property over
and above wages and property devoted to plan payments return to the Chapter 13 debtor under
§ 1327(b), are no longer "property of the estate", and are subject to the reach of an alimony, support,
or maintenance creditor under § 362(b)(2)). Accord In re Johnson, 36 Bankr. 958, 959-60 (Bankr.
D. Utah 1983) (tax return not devoted to plan payments was not property of estate); Moore, 22
Bankr. at 201-02 (proceedings against debtor in state court for collection of past due alimony and
child support stayed until debtor's ex-wife could show cause for relief from the stay); Sak, 21 Bankr.
305 (Chapter 13 debtor's ex-wife sought judgment vacating automatic stay in order to proceed in
collection of past due and accruing alimony and child support). See Denn, 37 Bankr. 33, in which
the Chapter 13 debtor's attorney included a provision in the Chapter 13 plan which submitted all
of his client's future wages to the extent necessary for the execution of the Chapter 13 plan to the
supervision and control of the Chapter 13 trustee. The plan stated that property of the estate would
not vest in the debtor until dismissal or conversion of the case or until the debtor received a discharge.
The debtor's ex-spouse garnished his post-petition wages and was required to return the amounts
so garnished on the ground that she had violated the stay by attempting to collect from property of
the estate amounts owed by the debtor for back child support. Id. at 35-36. It is not clear from the
reported decision whether all of the debtor's post-petition earnings were ever actually devoted to
the payments proposed in the Chapter 13 plan.
114. Summerlin, 26 Bankr. at 878 (exempt property in a Chapter 11 is not property of the estate
and is subject to ex-spouse's claims for alimony under § 362 (b)(2)); Adams, 12 Bankr. 540 (exempt
property not devoted to funding a Chapter 13 plan is not property of the estate and, under § 362(b)(2),
ex-spouse may satisfy claims for back alimony and support from such property). See also Kennedy,
supra note 92, at 25.
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the Code is not explicit in stating how or when property of the estate
leaves the estate once it has been exempted." 5
This issue is not the equivalent of the medieval theological debate
regarding the quantity of celestial beings able to dance on the head of a
pin. It is important since, if property claimed as exempt ceases to be
property of the estate as soon as the list of exempt property is filed by
the debtor, the alimony, support, or maintenance claimant may immediately proceed against such property without violating the automatic
stay. If, however, property claimed as exempt remains property of the
estate until the thirty-day period in which to file an objection to the
debtor's claim of exemptions passes uneventfully, or even later regarding
property to which an objection is timely filed, the claimant's attorney
proceeding against such property will violate the automatic stay. As a
result, either the claimaint, the claimant's attorney, or both could be
found in contempt of the bankruptcy court and ordered to pay to the
debtor all damages caused by the violation of the stay.16
One court has stated that as soon as property is claimed as exempt it
ceases to be property of the estate. 7 Other courts have held that property
claimed as exempt ceases to be property of the estate and revests as
property of the debtor only after the thirty-day period for objection to
exemptions expires. "' A Minnesota bankruptcy court has held that where
115. Kennedy, supra note 114, at 38 n. 158 (1978). Professor Kennedy goes on to state:
Section 541(a) declares that the property of the estate comprises all legal or
equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of the
case. Section 522(l), however, says that property claimed as exempt in a list
filed by the debtor is exempt unless a party in interest objects. Presumably,
such a list will ordinarily be filed with the debtor's petition in a voluntary
case. . . . Arguably, exempt property never enters and therefore never leaves
the estate when the debtor claims his exemptions concurrently with the filing
of the petition, if no objection is raised to the claim. If objection is made, it
is not clear whether the property claimed comes into the estate pending the
resolution of the issue raised or only after there has been a determination adverse
to the claim of exemption.
Bankruptcy Rule 4003(b) provides that the trustee or any creditor may file objections to a claim of
exemptions within 30 days after the conclusion of the meeting of creditors or the filing of any
amendment to the list of claimed exemptions unless further time to object is granted by the court.
Rule 4003(b).
116. Penalties for violations of the automatic stay are discussed infra at notes 141-55 and accompanying text.
117. Summerlin, 26 Bankr. at 878 (once property is claimed as exempt it is no longer property
of the estate and is subject to alimony claims).
118. In re Kretzer, 48 Bankr. 585, 588 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1985) (debtor claimed pickup truck as
exempt without objection by any party in interest and, therefore, repossession by credit union did
not violate stay because the truck was no longer property of the estate); In re Wiesner, 39 Bankr.
963, 965 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1984) (railroad cars became property of debtor after the then-applicable
fifteen-day period for objections to exemptions expired without objection); In re Cassell, 41 Bankr.
737, 740 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1984) (debtor claimed automobile as exempt without objection by a
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an objection was filed regarding property claimed as exempt, the property
did not leave the estate until the bankruptcy court's order determining
the matter became final." 9
The cautious practitioner seeking to collect alimony, maintenance, or
support obligations from exempt property will either allow the thirty-day
objection period to pass or seek a ruling from the court that the property
in question is exempt before proceeding against such property in order
to avoid violating the automatic stay. 2 In one noted commentator's view,
the exclusion of collection activity by alimony, maintenance, or support
creditors by section 362(b)(2) from the automatic stay is not limited by
its terms to the collection of nondischargeable support obligations. 2' He
notes that the debtor or the trustee may seek an injunction against an
effort to collect dischargeable alimony, maintenance, or support obligations from the debtor pursuant to section 105.122
However, this issue does not appear to have been so resolved by the
courts. Several decisions hold that the section 362(b)(2) exemption to the
stay applies only to nondischargeable debts for alimony, maintenance, or
support, and that if there is uncertainty about the dischargeability of the
obligation and the resulting applicability of section 362(b), the claimant
should petition the bankruptcy court for clarification. 123 The claimant and
party in interest so the automobile passed from the estate to the debtor, thereby terminating automatic
stay); In re Williamson, 11 Bankr. 791 (Bankr. W.D. Pa. 1981) (filing bankruptcy created an estate
which included the debtor's property, but once claimed as exempt without objection within the thenapplicable fifteen-day period, exempt property was no longer property of the estate).
119. In re Oliver, 38 Bankr. 245, 247 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1984) (foreclosure proceedings brought
against real property before the court's final determination of creditor's objection to exemption
violated the stay).
120. Such a ruling is obtained by a motion seeking relief from the automatic stay. Bankruptcy
Rules 4001 and 9014 govern requests for relief from the automatic stay.
121. Kennedy, supra note 92, at 26.
122. Id. Alimony, support, or maintenance may be determined to be a dischargeable property
settlement obligation under § 523(a)(5)(B). See infra notes 167-288 and accompanying text.
123. In re Pody, 42 Bankr. 570, 573-74 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1984) (ex-spouse violated the automatic
stay by not releasing garnishment on debtor's wages in an effort to collect a debt determined to be
a nondischargeable property settlement obligation); Van Hoose v. Van Hoose, 31 Bankr. 332, 33637 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1983) (automatic stay prevents commencement or continuation of collection
actions until dischargeability of family obligation is determined); Stamper v. Stamper, 17 Bankr.
216, 221 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (ex-spouse found in contempt of bankruptcy court for violating
the automatic stay by initiating state court contempt action against debtor before obtaining a determination of the dischargeability of family obligation); In re Bailey, 20 Bankr. 906, 913 (W.D. Wis.
1982) (section 362(b)(2) exception to the automatic stay does not apply to efforts to collect dischargeable property settlement obligations). See also Summerlin, 26 Bankr. at 877-78 (where exspouse sought relief from the automatic stay in order to collect family obligation, bankruptcy court
first determined that the debt was a nondischargeable support obligation and then held that the
automatic stay did not prevent efforts to collect alimony from property which is not property of the
estate). A similar approach was taken by the court in In re Renzulli, 28 Bankr. 41, 43-46 (Bankr.
N.D. I11.1982).
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the claimant's attorney who do not do so proceed at their peril and take
the calculated risk of being held in contempt of the bankruptcy court for
violating the automatic stay. "24
C. DissolutionActions, Child Custody Actions, and Contempt
Proceedings
Although there is authority to the contrary, 125 most courts which have
addressed the issue have held that an action to dissolve the marriage bond
is automatically stayed.' 26 Similarly, the majority of courts hold that
actions in which adjudications of rights to spousal and child support are
sought'27 and to determine rights to the custody of children' 28 are stayed.
Finally, actions in which the non-debtor seeks a state court order29dividing
marital property are routinely held to be automatically stayed. 1
If the automatic stay applies to a state court proceeding, the bankruptcy
court may terminate or modify the stay on request of a party in interest
if grounds for so doing can be shown. 30 Requests to lift the automatic
stay in order to allow the dissolution action to proceed are routinely
granted for cause. "' Cause for lifting or modifying the automatic stay
124. See, e.g., Pody, 42 Bankr. at 573-74 (ex-spouse held in contempt of bankruptcy court for
violation of automatic stay and ordered to pay debtor's attorneys' fees and damages caused by the
violation of the stay). But see In re Charter First Mortgage, 42 Bankr. 380, 385 (Bankr. D. Or.
1984) (parties proceeding under one of the exemptions to the stay in § 362(b) may proceed as though
no bankruptcy had been filed). See also H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 342, reprinted
in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963, 6298; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 51,
reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5837 which state in part, "[b]y excepting
an act or action from the automatic stay, the bill simply requires that the trustee move the court into
action, rather than requiring the stayed party to request relief from the stay."
125. In re Schock, 37 Bankr. 399 (Bankr. D. N.D. 1984) (the automatic stay does not apply to
actions in which the dissolution of the marriage bond is sought).
126. In re Flagg, 17 Bankr. 677, 679 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982) (divorce action was stayed); Schulze
v. Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981) (divorce action was stayed).
127. Murray, 31 Bankr. 499 (stay applied to action in which ex-spouse sought an adjudication
of her rights to alimony and child support); In re Howard, 27 Bankr. 894 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. 1983)
(state court proceeding against debtor seeking an award of separate maintenance was automatically
stayed); In re Kaylor, 25 Bankr. 394 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982) (stay applied to an action seeking
spousal and child support); Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106 (automatic stay applied to action seeking order
for child support); Amonte, 17 Mass.App. 621, 461 N.E. 2d 826 (stay applied to proceedings to
award alimony and support); Rogers v. Rogers, 671 P.2d 160, 165 (Utah 1983) (automatic stay
applied to state court action seeking an ajudication of alimony and child support).
128. Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106 (action seeking an order regarding custody of children was stayed).
129. Schock 37 Bankr. 399 (stay prevented continuation of action to divide marital property);
Murray, 31 Bankr. 499 (stay applied to prevent partition of marital realty); Kaylor, 25 Bankr. 394
(stay applies to action to divide marital property).
130. 11 U.S.C. §362(d).
131. On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the bankruptcy court is
required to grant relief from the stay for "cause." Id. § 362(d)(1 ). Flagg, 17 Bankr. 677 (court lifted
automatic stay to allow divorce action to proceed on the ground the debtor failed to establish that
its continuation would interfere with bankruptcy case); Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106 (court lifted stay to
allow continuation of divorce action).
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exists, in the language of the legislative history of the Code, where there
is a "desire to permit an action to proceed to completion in another
tribunal"' and a "lack of any connection with or interference with the
pending bankruptcy case. For example, a divorce or child custody proceeding involving the debtor may bear no relation to the bankruptcy
case. "133 In light of this statement of congressional intent, it is not difficult
to discern why orders lifting the stay to allow the state court to determine
rights to the custody of children'34 and rights to alimony and spousal and
child support are routinely granted. 35
'
In contrast, bankruptcy courts are generally unwilling to lift or modify
the stay to allow a state court to enter orders dividing marital property
if that property is property of the estate. 36
' These decisions are understandable perhaps less because of the fact that federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction of the debtor's and the estate's property as of the
commencement of a bankruptcy case'37 than because of the tension between the fundamental purposes of bankruptcy and a state court action
dividing marital property. In liquidation cases, the debtor's assets are
temporarily protected from the claims of individual creditors to allow an
orderly and, in the case of unsecured creditors, collective distribution of
nonexempt assets to be made to creditors. The value of an individual
creditor's right to receive a share of nonexempt assets depends on the
aggregate value of the nonexempt assets of the bankruptcy estate and the
132. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 343, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6300.
133. Cause also is shown in a case in which the state proceeding bears no relationship to the
purpose of the stay-that of protecting the debtor and the debtor's estate from creditors. H.R. REP.
No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 5963,
6300; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 52, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5787, 5838.
134. Schulze, 15 Bankr. 106 (court lifted the automatic stay in order to allow determination of
matter relating to custody of children).
135. Murray, 31 Bankr. 499 (automatic stay modified to permit debtor's spouse obtain an adjudication of the awards of alimony and child support); Howard, 27 Bankr. 894 (court lifted automatic
stay to permit state court proceedings against debtor for an award of maintenance); Kaylor, 25 Bankr.
394 (stay modified in order to allow debtor's wife to obtain an award of alimony and child support
against debtor).
136. Schock, 37 Bankr. at 400 (refusing to lift stay to allow state court to enter any order affecting
property of the estate); Murray, 31 Bankr. at 502 (refusing to modify or lift stay to allow partition
of marital realty); Kaylor, 25 Bankr. 394 (refusing to lift stay either to allow division of property
or to allow enforcement of any state court order affecting property of the estate). But see Schulze,
15 Bankr. 106 (modifying stay to allow division of marital property by state court). See also In re
Willard, 15 Bankr. 898 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1981) (state court order entered awarding marital homestead
to wife after husband filed a Chapter 7 case did not bind the bankruptcy estate or affect title or
character of property of the estate).
137. 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d) (1982); See, e.g., Teel, 34 Bankr. 762 (community property of both
debtor and his spouse was property of the estate and, therefore, within the exclusive jurisdiction of
bankruptcy court, thereby precluding state court division of marital property until close of bankruptcy
case).
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aggregate value of the claims against those assets. To the extent that assets
are removed from the bankruptcy estate (as would occur in a state court
action to divide marital property) after the commencement of the case,
the value of an unsecured creditor's right to a distributive share in the
assets of the estate will be impaired. Thus, the purpose of an action to
divide marital property-to split the value of assets between a non-debtor
and debtor spouse-necessarily conflicts with the purpose of a liquidation
case.
The decisions are split on the question of whether state court contempt
proceedings arising out of the debtor's disobedience of a state court order
regarding alimony, maintenance, support, or a property settlement agreement are stayed. Bankruptcy courts have taken two approaches to this
issue. Some courts approach the issue using a "purpose" analysis. If the
purpose of the contempt proceeding is to punish the debtor for insubordinate conduct and to uphold the dignity of the state court, the contempt
proceeding is not stayed.' 3 8 On the other hand, if the purpose of the
contempt action is in fact to collect a debt, the action is stayed.139
The second approach taken by the courts with respect to the question
of whether contempt proceedings are stayed is to base the decision on
whether the contempt proceedings arose out of disobedience to a state
court order which was entered before or after the automatic stay was in
place. If the contempt action concerns a state court order entered prior
to the stay, the contempt action is not stayed, regardless of whether the
sentence or fine for the contempt is made after the stay became effective. "
Presumably, the contempt action is stayed if the state court order which
138. In re Spagat, 4 F.Supp. 926, 927 (S.D.N.Y. 1933) (contempt proceedings were not stayed
because through such proceedings court's dignity was vindicated).
139. Guariglia v. Community Nat'l Bank and Trust Co., 382 F.Supp. 758, 761 (E.D.N.Y. 1974)
(state court contempt order to collect debt through fine payable to creditor stayed) aft'd, 516 F.2d
896 (2d Cir. 1975); In re Thayer 24 Bankr. 491, 491-93 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1982) (contempt
proceedings against debtor's wife and her attorney for violating automatic stay by moving state court
to enforce contempt order against the debtor as method to collect debt); In re Marriage of Lytle,
105 I11.App. 3d 1095, 435 N.E.2d 522, 525 (1982) (state court contempt proceedings stayed because
invoked as a sanction for failure to pay a property settlement obligation rather than to uphold "the
dignity of the court").
140. In re Hall, 170 F. 721 (S.D.N.Y. 1909) (debtor disobeyed state court order entered prior to
the stay, and as a result, state court proceedings for criminal contempt were not stayed by the
bankruptcy court even though the fine was not awarded before the stay); In re Dumas, 19 Bankr.
676, 678 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (state court's sentence for contempt entered after bankruptcy for
disobedience of court order entered before bankruptcy not stayed); In re Ackerman, 28 Bankr. 509,
511 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983) (state court contempt action initiated before bankruptcy for failure to
abide by the state court's support order was stayed); Moore, 22 Bankr. at 202 (even though property
of the bankruptcy estate is protected by the automatic stay debtor may proceed against debtor in
state court by way of a contempt proceeding to enforce state court alimony award entered prior to
stay).
Although the court in Dumas, 19 Bankr. at 677 cited David v. Hooker, Ltd., 560 F.2d 412 (9th
Cir. 1977) for the proposition that contempt actions arising out of disobedience to state court orders
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is the subject of the contempt action was entered after the stay was in
place.
D. Consequences of a Violation
Serious consequences attend the decision to proceed against the debtor
with any activity, such as a state court dissolution action or a contempt
action for delinquent support, that may violate the automatic stay. Orders
or judgments obtained in violation of the stay are frequently held to be
nullities and attorneys as well as clients are regularly found in contempt
of the bankruptcy court, fined, and ordered to pay damages for willful
violations of the stay. An application of the rule that orders entered in
violation of the stay are void could result in the invalidity of a dissolution
order or decree and in other obvious and embarrassing consequences for
attorney and client alike.
Many courts hold that judgments or orders obtained in violation of the
automatic stay are void. The ancestor of this proposition is the Supreme
Court's decision, Kalb v. Feuerstein,'' in which the Court held that a
foreclosure sale in violation of the stay was a nullity.
This rule has been applied frequently to a variety of actions, judgments,
and orders entered in violation of the automatic stay imposed by section
362 of the Code. 41 2 However, it has also been held that "the characterization of every violation of section 362 as being absolutely void [is]
inaccurate and overly broad""4 3 due to the power of the court to annul
entered prior to bankruptcy are not stayed, the court's ruling in Hooker is ambiguous. The Hooker
court cited both Spagat, 4 F. Supp. at 927 (any contempt order entered by state court for the purpose
of upholding the dignity of the court is not stayed) and Hall, 170 F. 721 (state court order setting
fine after bankruptcy filed not stayed because the disobedience to the state court order occurred prior
to bankruptcy), and then simply decided that the contempt action was not stayed without explicitly
adopting either approach.
141. 308 U.S. 433 (1940).
142. See, e.g., In re Advent Corp., 24 Bankr. 612, 614 (Bankr. 1st Cir. 1982) (action to cancel
bond void regardless of lack of knowledge of filing of bankruptcy case); Willard, 15 Bankr. at 900901 (state court order dividing marital property after bankruptcy case was filed was effective between
the parties but ineffective against the estate); In re Scott, 24 Bankr. 738 (Bankr. M.D. Ala. 1982)
(foreclosure sale in violation of stay void regardless of creditor's lack of knowledge of filing of
bankruptcy case); In re Miller, 10 Bankr. 778, 780 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (repossession of debtor's
car violated stay and was void and without effect), aff'd, 22 Bankr. 479 (D.C. Md. 1982); Young,
14 Bankr. 809 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1981) (tax sale to satisfy prepetition debt was in violation of the
stay and was null and void); Johnson, 16 Bankr. 193 (replevin judgment obtained in violation of
the stay was void); United Northwest Fed. Credit Union Arena, 233 Kan. 514, 516, 664 P.2d 811,
813 (1983) (filing of foreclosure action was void and without effect); Amonte, 17 Mass. App. 621,
461 N.E.2d 826 (order for separate support entered in violation of stay was void); Rogers, 671 P.2d
at 165 (state court order dividing marital property in violation of the automatic stay was "ineffective").
Contra Willard, 15 Bankr. at 900 (judgment of dissolution entered after filing of bankruptcy petition
was not void by reason of automatic stay but judgment had no effect on property of the estate).
143. In re Fuel Oil Supply and Terminaling, Inc., 30 Bankr. 360, 362 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1983)
(good faith actions under sections 542(c), 546, and 549(c) not absolutely void).
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the automatic stay. 1 The use of the word "annul" in section 362(d) has
been interpreted to authorize the bankruptcy court to exercise its discretion
and ratify a state court judgment obtained in violation of the stay.' 5
Whether actions, judgments, or orders in violation of the stay are void
or voidable, it is clear that their validity is, at best, subject to the discretion
of the bankruptcy court. Caution being the better part of valor, the wise
family law lawyer will seek leave of the bankruptcy court before proceeding with any action that arguably violates the automatic stay. "
The Code also provides pecuniary disincentives for continuing any
action or activity in violation of the stay without an order lifting, terminating, or modifying the automatic stay. Actual damages, including
costs and attorneys' fees, and, in appropriate circumstances, punitive
damages may be recovered by any individual injured by a willful violation
of the automatic stay.147 Willful violation of the stay means intentional
or deliberate action to violate the stay."'4 An award of punitive damages
is based on the gravity of the offense and should be set at a sufficient
amount to ensure that the offending party is punished and deterred from
such conduct.' 49 Action taken in ignorance of the stay or the filing of the
bankruptcy case generally is not considered a willful violation.' 50
144. 11 U.S.C. §362(d).
145. Oliver, 38 Bankr. at 248 (foreclosure proceedings in violation of automatic stay were not
void because the debtor did nothing to attempt to enforce the stay for a period of seven months);
In re Mellor, 31 Bankr. 151, 154 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (bankruptcy court could ratify state court
judgment obtained in violation of the automatic stay), rev'd on other grounds, 734 F.2d 1396 (9th
Cir. 1984). On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals refused to reach "the serious question
which is presented where a bankruptcy court purports to annul an automatic stay in order to attempt
retroactively to validate avoid state court judgment. . . . Since, in the instant matter, the Appellate
Panel's decision construing the validity of an attempt to annul retroactively an automatic stay in
order to avoid the rule of Kalb v. Feuerstein was based on a faulty factual and legal premise, the
decision appealed from should not be given any precedential effect." Id. at 1402.
146. A request for relief from the automatic stay must be made by motion in the bankruptcy
court. Bankruptcy Rules 4001(a); 9014. The automatic stay may be lifted "for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property" of the moving party and with respect to a
stay of an act against property, where the debtor has no equity in the property and it is not necessary
to an effective reorganization. 11 U.S.C. § 362(d).
147. 11 U.S.C. §362(h).
148. In re Tel-a-Communications Consultants, Inc., 50 Bankr. 250, 254 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1985)
(willful, in the context of § 523(a)(6), which relates to the nondischargeability of debts caused by
willful and malicious injury to the person or property of another entity, has been construed to mean
intentional or deliberate); In re Mercer, 48 Bankr. 562, 565 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1985) (punitive
damages may be awarded if the offending party has committed an intentional wrong without any
legal justification).
149. Mercer, 48 Bankr. at 564 (stereo rental company required to pay $5,000 in punitive damages
for egregious conduct while repossessing stereo equipment in violation of the stay); In re Shriver,
46 Bankr. 626, 627 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1985) (debtor's own bad faith conduct precluded an award
of damages).
150. Van Hoose, 31 Bankr. 332 (ex-wife's letter to judge technically violated stay but court held
a finding of contempt was not warranted because she was merely expressing concern about paying
marital debts due to ex-husband's bankruptcy); In re Ramage, 39 Bankr. 37 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984)
(former spouse not held in contempt for continuing litigation against debtor after bankruptcy because
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Violators of the stay can also be held in contempt of court. 5 ' Some
courts require evidence that the violators had actual knowledge of the
stay before imposing a contempt sanction. 152 Others require only evidence
that the violator had notice or actual knowledge of the filing of the
bankruptcy petition and infer knowledge of the existence of the automatic
stay. ' Attorneys 4 as well as clients' 55 have been held in contempt of
court and are frequently ordered to pay the debtor's attorney's fees and
costs incurred by reason of the violation of the stay.
E. Duration
The automatic stay does not remain in effect forever. It may be terminated or modified by the bankruptcy court on motion of a party in
interest if sufficient grounds for doing so exist.' 56 However, even if relief
she mistakenly believed the debt was nondischargeable); In re Gray, 41 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. S.D.
Ohio 1984) (recipient who commenced contempt action for nonpayment of child support in violation
of stay not subject to sanction because she acted as an innocent and uninformed instrument of the
county); Johnson, 16 Bankr. 193 (individual who proceeded in nonbankruptcy forum in violation
of stay not held in contempt because element of intentional willfulness was lacking).
151. Bailey, 20 Bankr. 906 (attorney held in contempt for violating the stay by securing a lien
on the debtor's homestead even though he thought the stay did not apply); Thayer, 24 Bankr. 491
(ex-spouse and her attorney found in contempt of bankruptcy court for proceeding with state contempt
action for delinquent support and property settlement obligations).
152. In re Associated Hobby Manufacturers, Inc., 33 Bankr. 959, 962 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983)
(knowledge of stay required, not just knowledge of petition); In re Pal Transp., Inc., 13 Bankr.
935, 940-41 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981) (actual knowledge of the stay is required before finding of
contempt is entered).
153. In re Zartun, 30 Bankr. 544, 546 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983) (knowledge of bankruptcy
is the legal equivalent of know[ledge] of the stay"); Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 913 (debtor's attorney's
erroneous belief that stay did not apply was insufficient to show excuse for violation); Thayer, 24
Bankr. at 493 (ex-spouse and her attorney found in contempt of bankruptcy court for proceeding
with state contempt action for delinquent support and property settlement obligations).
154. Bailey, 20 Bankr. 906 (ex-spouse's attorney found in contempt for fixing lien on debtor's
exempt property to satisfy divorce judgment in violation of stay and ordered to pay debtor's attorney's
and witness' fees incurred as a result of the violation).
155. Pody, 42 Bankr. 570 (ex-spouse found in contempt of bankruptcy court for refusing to release
garnishment on debtor's wages in violation of the stay and liable for debtor's attorney's fees and
damages for loss of use of wages, embarrassment, and anguish); Stamper, 17 Bankr. 216 (ex-spouse
found in contempt of the bankruptcy court and held liable for debtor's attorney's fees for proceeding
with state court contempt action before requesting a determination from bankruptcy court that
obligations pursuant to divorce decree were excepted from discharge and the automatic stay).
156. Section 362(d) provides:
On request of a party in interest and after notice and a hearing, the court shall
grant relief from the stay provided under subsection (a) of this section, such
as by terminating, annulling, modifying, or conditioning such stay(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in
property of such party in interest; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property under subsection (a)
of this section, if(A) the debtor does not have an equity in such property; and
(B) such property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.
11 U.S.C. § 362(d). Bankruptcy Rules 4001 and 9014 govern requests for relief from the automatic
stay.
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from the automatic stay is not obtained, eventually the stay terminates
just as it arose-automatically and without the necessity of a court order.
The automatic stay of any act against property of the estate continues
until the property is no longer property of the estate.' 57 Thus, alimony,
maintenance, and support claimants who wish to proceed against property
of the estate must determine when it ceases to exist as such.
As has already been discussed, property claimed as exempt by the
debtor eventually leaves the bankruptcy estate and ceases to exist as
property of the estate. Such property is then referred to as the property
of the debtor or as exempt property."'5 It will also be recalled that wages
earned after the bankruptcy case are not property of the estate in Chapter
7 or 11 cases but, in general, are property of the estate in Chapter 13
cases. 159
In addition, property of the estate ceases to exist as such upon its sale
or abandonment. 6 As is the case with exempt property, the Code is silent
as to when sale or abandonment of property of the estate has the effect
of transforming its status to non-estate property, 6 ' but it is likely that
this transformation is effective in uncontested situations when the property
is actually sold or abandoned. Usually the trustee abandons property to
the person with a possessory interest in the property. This person typically
will be the debtor. Thus, abandoned property frequently becomes property
of the debtor.
To the extent that an act against the debtor or an act against property
of the debtor is stayed'62 by the provisions of section 362, the stay is not
' 63
terminated "if the property leaves the estate and goes to the debtor"'
as frequently occurs when the trustee abandons property. In such cases,
the stay continues until the earliest of three events: the time the case is
closed"6 or dismissed 165 or the time the debtor is granted a discharge." 6
Thus, a property settlement claimant whose claim is secured by an en157. 11 U.S.C. §362(c)(1).
158. See, e.g., Id. §§ 362(a)(5), 522(c). See supra notes 118-20 and infra 178-84 and accompanying text.
159. See supra notes 49-77 and 108-20 and accompanying text.
160. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. &ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6300.
161. Kennedy, supra note 92, at 38.
162. See Bankruptcy Rules 6004 and 6007 for the procedural rules associated with sales and
abandonments.
163. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 343, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6299.
164. 11 U.S.C. §350(a) and Bankruptcy Rule 5009 provide that when an estate has been fully
administered and the court has discharged the trustee, the case shall be closed by the bankruptcy
court.
165. 11 U.S.C. § 305, 349, 1112, and 1307 govern the dismissal of bankruptcy proceedings.
166. Id. § 362(c)(2). Id. §§ 524, 727, 1141, and 1328 govern discharge. See infra notes 189-226
and accompanying text.
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forceable lien on property abandoned by the trustee to the debtor may
not proceed against the property, absent an order lifting the stay, until
one of the three events listed above occurs.
V. THE DISCHARGE AND DISCHARGEABILITY
OF FAMILY OBLIGATIONS

The bankruptcy discharge is the principal mechanism through which
"the honest debtor [is relieved] from the weight of indebtedness which
has become oppressive and [is permitted] to have a fresh start. .. 167
In general, all debtors receive the benefit of a discharge and all debts are
' However, under certain circumstances, a
dischargeable in bankruptcy. 68
debtor can be denied a discharge of his debts. 69 In the event the debtor
70
is denied a discharge, the debtor remains personally liable for all debts. 1
A debtor may be denied a Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 discharge as a result
of the debtor's status,' 7 ' pre-petition conduct which is in some sense
unethical or fraudulent, 17 or as a result of a previous discharge in bankruptcy.173 A Chapter 13 discharge is more readily available and can be
percentage of the
obtained if the debtor completes all or a specified
74
payments called for in the Chapter 13 plan. 1
Even where the debtor receives a discharge, he remains liable for debts
which are not dischargeable in bankruptcy. 75 Some debts are not dis167. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
168. I1 U.S.C. §§523, 727, 1141, 1328.
169. Id. §§ 727(a), 1141(d)(3), 1328(a)-(b).
170. Id. § 524. Where the debtor is denied a discharge, the creditors may recommence collection
efforts against the debtor when the bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed, whichever occurs earlier.
Id. § 362(c).
171. Only individuals receive a Chapter 7 discharge. Id. § 727(a)(1).
172. A debtor may be denied a discharge for engaging in a fraudulent conveyance [id. § 727(a)(2)],
for concealing, destroying, or falsifying financial books or records [Id. § 727(a)(3)], or engaging in
specified fraudulent or otherwise objectionable conduct in connection with the bankruptcy case [Id.
§ 727(a)(4)-(7)]. See also Id. § 1141(d)(3)(C) which deprives an individual Chapter 11 debtor of a
discharge if the debtor would have been denied a discharge under Chapter 7. In addition, a Chapter
11 debtor's eligibility for a discharge depends on the nature of the Chapter 11 plan and whether the
debtor engages in business after consummation of the plan. Id. § I141(d)(3)(A)-(B).
173. An individual seeking a Chapter 7 or I I discharge will not receive one if the debtor received
a previous discharge under Chapter 7 or Chapter II within the six years prior to the filing of the
bankruptcy petition. Id. §§727(a)(8), 1141(d)(3)(C). An individual who received a Chapter 13
discharge within the six years immediately preceding Chapter 7 petition is nevertheless eligible for
a Chapter 7 discharge under certain circumstances. Id. § 727(a)(9).
174. Id. § 1328(a)-(c). There are two types of Chapter 13 discharges. More debts are dischargeable
under an 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a) discharge than under a "hardship" discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 1328(b)
(1982). Compare id. § 1328(a)(2) with § 1328(c)(2).
175. Id. §§ 523(a), 1141(d), 1328(a)-(c). Individuals receiving aChapter 11 discharge or aChapter
13 hardship discharge may discharge only those debts dischargeable in a Chapter 7 case. Id. §§ 1141(d)(2),
1328(c)(2). However, a "regular" Chapter 13 discharge will discharge many debts which are otherwise nondischargeable under Chapter 7. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a).
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chargeable because they were incurred fraudulently or as a result of other
socially undesirable conduct.' 76 Others are not dischargeable because of
the nature of the debt itself. 177 Part V of this Article considers an exception
to debt dischargeability which falls into the latter category: the exception
to discharge for debts in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support.
A. HistoricalBackground
Even before Congress codified an exception to discharge for family
support obligations, debtors were unable to discharge family support
obligations in bankruptcy. In Audubon v. Shufeldt, 17 1 the United States
Supreme Court held that alimony could not be characterized as a provable
debt because it "did not arise from any business transaction, but from
the relation of marriage" and was "not founded on contract, express or
implied, but on the natural and legal duty of the husband to support the
wife. ,'79 Since only provable debts could be discharged in bankruptcy,
post-marital family obligations could not be discharged. 8 '
Shortly thereafter, the Court held that a child support obligation could
not be discharged in bankruptcy even though the obligation was evidenced
by a contract and had not been incorporated into the divorce decree.'
Congress and the Supreme Court quickly laid to rest any remaining doubts
concerning the nondischargeability of family support obligations. In 1903,
Congress codified an exception to discharge for family obligations" 2 and,
in 1904, the Supreme Court held that this statute was merely declaratory
of existing law.' 83 The language of the statutory exception to discharge
176. For example, debts incurred through the use of false pretenses, false representations, or
false financial statements are nondischargeable (Id. § 523(a)(2)), as are those incurred as a result of
embezzlement, larceny, or defalcation while acting in a fiduciary capacity (Id. § 523(a)(4)). Debts
arising from the debtor's willful and malicious injury to persons or property and from the debtor's
operation of a motor vehicle while intoxicated are also nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6) and (9).
177. Debts for taxes and student loans of specified vintages as well as fines and penalties owed
to governmental units are nondischargeable. Id. §§ 523(a)(1), 523(a)(7), 523(a)(8). In addition, debts
for alimony, maintenance, and support are nondischargeable. Id. § 523(a)(5). Section 523(a)(2)(c)
declares consumer debts for "luxury goods or services" incurred within a specified time frame to
be nondischargeable. Creditors whose debts are not discharged in bankruptcy may recommence
collection efforts against the debtor as soon as the bankruptcy case is closed or dismissed or the
debtor receives a discharge, whichever occurs earlier. However, the property to which they may
look in satisfaction of their nondischargeable debts is usually restricted to nonexempt property. Id.
§§ 362(c), 522(c)(1). See infra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
178. 181 U.S. 575 (1901).
179. Id. at 577.
180. Under the Bankruptcy Act, a debt included "any debt, demand, or claim provable in bankruptcy...." Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 1, 30 Stat. 544 (repealed 1979).
181. Dunbar v. Dunbar, 190 U.S. 340 (1903).
182. Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch. 487, §5, 32 Stat. 797, 798.
183. Wetmore, 196 U.S. 68.
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for family support obligations did not change until the enactment of the
Bankruptcy Code in 1979."84
Under the present Bankruptcy Code, debts for alimony, maintenance,
and support are nondischargeable obligations under section 523(a)(5). 85
'
To be nondischargeable, a familial obligation must be a debt to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor for alimony, maintenance, or support
which arose in connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree,
or other order of a court of record, determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or in connection with
a property settlement agreement." 6 It is not enough that the debt be
designated as alimony, maintenance, or support. The obligation will be
discharged unless it is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or
support. 87
' An otherwise nondischargeable familial obligation can be discharged if it has been assigned, unless the assignment was made to a
governmental entity or pursuant to section 402(a)(26) of the Social Security Act. 88
'
B. DistinguishingSupport Obligationsfrom Property Settlement
Obligations
In all types of chapter proceedings under the Bankruptcy Code, an
individual's family support obligations are nondischargeable. Obligations
arising from efforts to divide marital property, however, are dischargeable
184. The statute stated in part that "[a] discharge in bankruptcy shall release a bankrupt from all
of his provable debts, except such as . . . (2) are liabilities . . . for alimony due or to become due,
or maintenance or support of wife or child ....
Act of Feb. 5, 1903, Pub. L. No. 57-62, ch.
487, §5, 32 Stat 797, 798 (amending Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 17, 30 Stat. 544, 550)
(repealed 1979).
185. Section 523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code provides in part:
(a) A discharge . . . does not discharge an individual debtor from any debt(5) to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor, for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of such spouse or child, in connection with a
separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order of a court of record,
determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement, but not to the extent
that(A) such debt is assigned to another entity, voluntarily, by operation of
law, or otherwise (other than debts assigned pursuant to section 402(a)(26)
of the Social Security Act, or any such debt which has been assigned
to the Federal Government or to a State or any political subdivision
of such State); or
(B) such debt includes a liability designated as alimony, maintenance, or
support, unless such liability is actually in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support. . ..
186. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).
187. Id. § 523(a)(5)(B).
188. Id. §523(a)(5)(A).
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in bankruptcy.' 89 It is usually relatively simple to determine if a debt
represents an obligation for child support. However, the critical task of
distinguishing between a spousal support obligation and a property settlement obligation is far more difficult since the court, and the parties
themselves, frequently take into account either the amount of marital
property to be transferred to a recipient spouse when making an award
of spousal support or the award of spousal support to the recipient spouse
when dividing marital property. As a result, the characterization of the
obligation as spousal support or as a property settlement in a court order
or an agreement between the parties does not always reflect the true nature
of the obligation. "
Despite the difficulty of distinguishing between the two types of obligations, section 523(a)(5)(B) of the Code requires that such a distinction
be made. This section defines the scope of the marital discharge exception
by providing that a family support debt is nondischargeable only if "such
liability is actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance, or support. "19'
As a result, labels placed on an obligation by the parties or the state court
in the divorce decree or marital property settlement agreement do not
control the determination of whether the debt is dischargeable in bankruptcy. 12 The legislative history of the family support exception to discharge indicates that Congress intended the determination of the status
of the obligation to include more than an inquiry into the state law
classification of the obligation: "What constitutes alimony, maintenance,
93
or support, will be determined under the bankruptcy law, not state law." '
State law has not become entirely irrelevant, however, because there is
189. Id. §§523(a)(5), 1141(d)(2), 1228(a), (c), 1328(a), (c); Boyle v. Donovan, 724 F.2d 681,
683 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Maitlen, 658 F.2d 466 (7th Cir. 1981). Obligations for alimony, maintenance, and spousal and child support are referred to as "family support" obligations or debts
throughout this and the following six sections.
190. H. CLARK, LAW OF DOMESTIC RELA-FIONS § 14.8 (1968).
191. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5)(B).
192. In re Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641, 645-46 (Bankr. S.D. Ga. 1983) (applying principle that
dischargeability is determined by substance of liability rather than form, court held agreement to
pay additional monthly payments, second mortgage on house, bank note, and law school expenses
was intended as property settlement and dischargeable); In re Anderson, 21 Bankr. 335, 338 (Bankr.
S.D. Cal. 1982) (dissolution agreement expressly stating that wife was to receive a percentage of
debtor's military pension as her share of community property held to be actually in the nature of
support and nondischargeable); In re Hughes, 16 Bankr. 90, 92 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1981) (agreement
to pay second mortgage and bill owed to hospital was actually promise to provide support to former
wife and nondischargeable); Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 909 (labels and recitations in divorce decree not
determinative of nature of award, but rather court must look to the form of the award, and the
circumstances of the parties to determine whether a need for support exists).
193. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws, 5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865.
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"no federal law of domestic relations. "19 4 Indeed, these are matters which
traditionally have been viewed as falling within the exclusive domain of
the state courts.' 95 Consequently, the courts are not uniform in the degree
of reliance they place on state law in distinguishing between support and
property settlement obligations nor in the general approach used to make
this distinction. The alternative approaches to this question are examined
in detail in this section but may also be briefly summarized.
In some jurisdictions, the state's law which otherwise governs the
obligation plays a primary role in determining whether the debt is a
dischargeable property settlement obligation or a nondischargeable support obligation. In others, general principles of the law of domestic relations, rather than specific state law, are considered in this determination.
Many courts emphasize the parties' or the family court's intention in
creating the obligation in characterizing it for the purpose of discharge.
There is a split of authority regarding the propriety of examining the
parties' present or past financial circumstances in determining whether a
debt represents a nondischargeable support obligation.
1. The Role of State Law
Whatever the approach taken, state law cannot be ignored when determining whether a debt represents a support obligation. 96 However, the
manner and degree to which state law plays a role in this determination
varies widely. It is frequently held that state law can provide useful
guidance, but that its characterization of the obligation is not binding.' 9 7
Therefore, in determining whether an obligation is a nondischargeable
support debt, some courts consider the same factors generally used by
state courts in the decision whether to impose a support obligation. While
some courts focus exclusively on the factors relevant under the particular
194. De Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 580 (1956).
195. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 389 (1971) (Black, J., dissenting) (absent specific
federal constitutional or statutory provisions, marriage and divorce are completely under state control).
196. See, e.g., In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103, 1107-08 (6th Cir. 1983) (Congress did not intend
bankruptcy courts to ignore well-developed state law principles in determining whether assumption
of loan was in the nature of alimony or support); In re Spong, 661 F2d 6, 9 (2d Cir. 198 1) (Congress
did not intend for federal courts to formulate the bankruptcy law of alimony and support in a vacuum
without any reference to well-established state law).
197. See, e.g., Maiden, 658 F.2d at 467 (court looked to Indiana case law for principles to guide
interpretation of the nature of agreement to pay debts); In re King, 15 Bankr. 127, 129 (Bankr. D.
Kan. 1981) (although bankruptcy courts are not bound by state law characterization of debts, most
courts look to state law, as well as the dissolution decree, for guidance); In re Dirks, 15 Bankr.
775, 779 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1981) (bankruptcy court has power to look at the language and intent of
a state court order regarding family support obligations or property settlements to insure their power
is not abused by a mischaracterization of the nature of such obligation).
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state's family law,'98 others concentrate on general principles of the law
of domestic relations.1 99
The factors most frequently considered by courts concentrating on
general principles of domestic relations law include: the presence or
absence of provisions for alimony, maintenance, or support in the divorce
or separation decree or marital property agreement; the absolute or contingent nature of the award (i.e., whether it terminates or survives upon
the former spouse's death or remarriage or upon the children reaching
majority); the method by which the debt may be enforced (i.e., by execution and levy or by contempt proceedings); whether the award is final
or is subject to modification due to changed circumstances; whether the
obligation is payable in a lump sum or periodically; the length of the
marriage; the existence of children from the marriage; the relative earning
power of the parties; the age, health, and work skills of the parties; and
the label given the award by the state court."
Several courts have focused on whether or not there is an underlying
state law obligation to pay alimony, maintenance, or child support in
determining the nature of the obligation.2 1 Under this approach, any
obligation arising out of a dissolution decree or marital property agreement
would presumably be dischargeable if there is no obligation to provide
such support under state law, even if the parties intended the obligation
to function as support. However, the judicial trend and the better view
198. Maiden, 658 F.2d at 468-69 (court looked to Indiana case law for factors to consider in
distinguishing property division from support obligations such as the location of the provision in
the separation agreement which created obligation, whether children were involved, indications that
obligation was intended to balance the relative income of the parties, whether the obligation terminated
upon death or remarriage); Rule v. Rule, 612 F.2d 1098 (8th Cir. 1980) (court looked to Arkansas
law and concluded that husband's obligation to pay alimony did not terminate automatically upon
wife's remarriage and that remarriage was only one factor to be considered); Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775
(factors used under New Mexico's law to determine nature of an obligation include value and income
of property awarded; wife's need after division of community property; wife's age, health, and
means of support; wife's work experience; husband's earning capacity and future earnings; length
of marriage; amount of property owned by each; whether obligation was modifiable; and whether
obligation terminated on remarriage or death).
199. See, e.g., In re Yeates, 44 Bankr. 575, 578 (D. Utah 1984) (general principles of state law
determine if support obligation exists); In re Rachmiel, 19 Bankr. 721, 723-24 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1982); In re Petoske, 16 Bankr. 412, 414 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1982).
200. Shaver v. Shaver, 736 F.2d 1314, 1316-17 (9th Cir. 1984); Stout v. Prussel, 691 F.2d 859,
861 (9th Cir. 1982); Yeates, 44 Bankr. at 579; In re Ploski, 44 Bankr. 911, 913-14 (Bankr. D.N.H.
1984); Anderson, 21 Bankr. at 338; Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 910; Rachmiel, 19 Bankr. at 724; Petoske,
16 Bankr. at 413-14; In re Ingram, 5 Bankr. 232, 235 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980).
201. See, e.g., Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1107 (state law can not be ignored in determination of
nature of obligation and bankruptcy court erred in holding that language of separation agreement
controlled dischargeability issue); In re Knight, 29 Bankr. 748, 751-52 (W.D.N.C. 1983) (North
Carolina legislation and case law supported finding that counsel fees were in the nature of alimony);
Miller, 8 Bankr. 174 (hold harmless agreement representing debts for travel trailer, general merchandise, and gasoline purchases which were not property or services necessary for support of exwife and child was dischargeable); In re Pelikant, 5 Bankr. 404, 407 (Bankr. N.D. I11.1980) (award
of attorney's fees under Illinois statute is based on husband's duty to support wife, and therefore,
falls within definition of alimony for purposes of dischargeability).
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runs counter to this criterion for dischargeability. Several circuits have
characterized debts which could not have been imposed under the applicable state law legal duty of support as nondischargeable support obligations.2 These decisions and those in which general principles of family
law are applied rather than a specific jurisdiction's family law appear to
federalize family law for purposes of the dischargeability determination.
2. The Intention of the Parties
The parties' intentions are also relevant in deciding whether the family
obligation is in the nature of support, particularly where a more federal
approach to the dischargeability of family obligations determination is
taken.2 °3 Whether the parties intended a particular obligation to serve as
support may be discerned directly from an examination of contracts and
agreements between them or indirectly from an examination of the factors
frequently considered by state courts in making an award of support.2 4
3. The Form of the Obligation
The form of payment of the obligation does not determine whether or
not it is dischargeable. Periodic payment obligations have been held to
represent nondischargeable support obligations 25 as well as dischargeable
202. In re Harrell, 754 F.2d 902, 904-05 (11 th Cir. 1985) (obligation to pay postmajority child
support and educational expense was nondischargeable support obligation even though state law did
not require parent to support child after age eighteen); Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316 (obligation owed
former spouse would not be considered alimony under state law but was nevertheless nondischargeable
as support obligation); Boyle, 724 F.2d at 683 (debtor's obligation to pay educational expenses was
nondischargeable child support obligation even though there was no state law duty to provide such
support). See also In re Williams, 703 F.2d 1055, 1057 (8th Cir. 1983) (obligation for attorneys'
fees was nondischargeable support obligation despite fact it was not considered support for some
purposes under state law).
203. Boyle, 724 F.2d at 683 (critical question in dischargeability determination is the function
parties intended agreement to serve at the time they entered into it); Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1109
(initial inquiry must be whether parties intended to provide support by assumption of joint debts
and, if so, the next inquiry is whether such assumption has the effect of providing the support
necessary to ensure former spouse's daily needs).
204. In re Altavilla, 40 Bankr. 938, 941 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) ($10,000 note payable to exwife was dischargeable where settlement agreement unambiguously characterized obligation as a
property settlement, obligation did not terminate upon death or remarriage of the wife, and financial
circumstances of the parties did not warrant inference that the obligation was intended as support).
See also W. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE § 27.61 (1981).
205. Shaver, 736 F.2d at 1316-17 ($150,000 debt payable over seventy-five month period was
in the nature of support of minor children involved, former spouse was unemployed and possessed
no job skills, and debtor had substantial income at time of divorce); Williams, 703 F.2d at 1057-58
(whether periodic payments labeled "property settlement" are in fact in the nature of a property
settlement rather than support, is a question of fact to be determined in light of all the facts and
circumstances relevant to the intention of the parties); Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. at 647 ($1,500 monthly
payments payable to former wife until her death or remarriage, and $350-per-child monthly payments
payable until each finish a four-year college program, were found to be alimony and child support);
In re Bradley, 17 Bankr. 107, 110-11 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1981) (periodic payments were nondischargeable support obligations where payable over a potentially long period of time, not for a total
sum, terminated upon debtor's death, paid directly to ex-spouse, and a child was involved).
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property division obligations.2"6 Lump sum obligations have been characterized as debts for family support 207 as well as property settlement
debts.2 8 Nondischargeable support obligations have also been found to
exist where the debtor was obliged to pay a portion of his retirement
benefits to the former spouse, 2' to pay for the family's medical treatment,"' and to pay the former spouse one-half the sale proceeds of the
marital home. 2"1' Obligations as varied as a promise to transfer a farm,2 12
to pay one-half of certain retirement benefits,2" 3 and to pay the former
spouse one-half the proceeds of a bank account 2 4 have been held to
represent property settlement obligations. Obligations payable to third
parties can be in the nature of support and therefore nondischargeable,
obligation and thus
or they can be in the nature of
21 5 a property settlement
dischargeable in bankruptcy.
4. The Present Financial Circumstances of the Parties
All jurisdictions in the United States allow alimony and support obligations due after the date of a petition or a motion for modification to
be modified upon a showing of changed financial circumstances. 1 6 In
206. Altavilla, 40 Bankr. at 941 ($10,000 note payable to ex-wife in monthly installments was
dischargeable because was in the nature of a property settlement); Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. at 648-49
(obligation to pay additional alimony of $423.69 per month for twelve years, regardless of remarriage
or death, was not actually in the nature of support); In re Presler, 34 Bankr. 895, 898-99 (Bankr.
M.D. Tenn. 1983) (agreement to pay "alimony in solido" in monthly installments until total sum
payed was dischargeable because not in the nature of support where ex-spouse had substantial
independent income of her own).
207. In re Froman, 43 Bankr. 609, 612-13 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (promissory notes payable
to ex-spouse were in the nature of "lump sum" alimony where without alimony, the award would
have been seventy-five dollars per month, which was inconsistent with the intentions of the parties
for the wife to remain at home and raise the child); In re Kline, 42 Bankr. 141, 143 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 1984) (lump sum payment was intended as support because the facts show ex-wife was on
welfare, wanted to conclude all affairs with her ex-husband, believed the only way she would actually
receive the money was to receive it in one payment rather than to rely on periodic payments, and
there was very little property involved in the settlement).
208. In re Hansen, 44 Bankr. 654, 655-56 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984); In re Polen, 30 Bankr.
572, 574 (Bankr. D. S.C. 1983); Rachmiel, 19 Bankr. at 724.
209. Erspan v. Badgett, 647 F.2d 550, 555 (5th Cir. 1981), reh'g denied, 659 F.2d 26 (5th Cir.
1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 945 (1982); Anderson, 21 Bankr. at 339.
210. Bradley, 17 Bankr. at 111.
211. In re Kiggins, 26 Bankr. 821, 824 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983).
212. Hansen, 44 Bankr. at 655-56.
213. In re Lelak, 38 Bankr. 164, 167-68 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1984).
214. In re Norfolk, 29 Bankr. 377, 378 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. 1983).
215. See infra notes 230-46 for a discussion of hold harmless agreements and notes 247-61 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the dischargeability of the debtor's obligation, as a result of
a dissolution order or marital property agreement, to pay the former spouse's attorney's fees and
other third party obligations.
216. The state statutes and case law providing for modification of alimony and support payments
are: Hartigan v. Hartigan, 272 Ala. 67, 128 So. 2d 725 (1961) (court has continuing jurisdiction to
modify periodic payments in divorce decree upon proof of substantial change in circumstances);
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most jurisdictions, however, modification is limited to future installments
of alimony. In these states, any amounts which have accrued before the
motion and which are unpaid will be neither modified nor revoked.2" 7 A
few jurisdictions, such as New York, allow modification of both accrued
and future support payments. 218
Debtors have argued that an examination of the present financial circumstances of both the debtor and the ex-spouse is relevant in the determination of the dischargeability of a family obligation. For example,
2 19 the debtor
in In re Harrell,
argued that unpaid arrearages were dischargeable because the accrued payments were not necessary for the exspouse's support due to her present financial circumstances. Therefore,
the debtor argued, the accrued payments could not be characterized as
in the nature of support. 2 20 A similar argument was advanced by the debtor
in Boyle v. Donovan22 1 with respect to accrued child support obligations.
The courts in both cases rejected the debtors' arguments and held that
accord Maddox v. Maddox, 267 Ala. 197, 160 So. 2d 481 (1964) (modification of a decree for
alimony due to change in husband's financial condition is permitted whether or not such power is
expressly reserved in the decree), and Dean v. Dean, 251 Ala. App. 249, 284 So. 2d 276 (1973)
(payments of alimony in installments and not in gross are subject to modifications based on a change
in circumstances. Lopez Gomez v. Superior Court, 103 D.P.R. 866 (1975); Castrillo v. Palmer, 102
D.P.R. 460 (1974); Fenning v. Superior Court, 96 P.R.R. 602 (1968); ALASKA STAT. § 25.24.170
(1983); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. 25-327A (1976 & Supp. 1985); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-1213 (1962
& Supp.1985); CAL. CIV. CODE §4812 (West 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-122 (1974); CONN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §46-54 (West 1973); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1519 (1975 & Supp. 1984); D.C.
CODE ENCYCL. § 16-914 (West 1966 & Supp. 1978); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.14 (West 1969 & Supp. 1985);
GA. CODE ANN. § 30-22 (1980 & Supp. 1985); HAW. REV. STAT. §580-51 (1976 & Supp. 1984);
IDAHO CODE § 32-709 (1983); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 40, § 510 (Smith-Hurd 1980 & Supp. 1985); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-17 (West 1979 & Supp. 1985); IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.25 (West 1981); KAN.
STAT. ANN. § 60-1610 (1983); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §403.25 (Bobbs-Merrill 1983); LA. CIv. CODE
ANN. art. 232 (West 1952); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §721 (1981); MD. FAM. LAW CODE ANN.
§ 11-107 (1984); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 208, § 37 (West 1958 & Supp.1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 552.28 (West 1967 & Supp. 1985); MINN. STAT. ANN. 518.64 (West Supp. 1985); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 93-5-23 (Supp. 1984); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 452.110 (Vernon 1977); MONT. CODE ANN. § 404-208 (1983); NEB. REV. STAT. § 42-365 (1984); NEV. REV. STAT. § 125.210 (1983); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 458.32 (1983); N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:34-23 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-47 (1983); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §236 (McKinney 1977 & Supp.1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. §5016.9(a) (1984); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-05-24 (1981); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3105.18 (Page 1980);
OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1289 (Supp. 1984); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 107.135 (Supp. 1984); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 23, § 501 (Purdon Supp. 1985); R.1. GEN. LAWS § 15-5-16 (Supp. 1984); S.C. CODE ANN.
§ 20-3-170 (Law Co-op 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 25-4-41 (1984); TENN. CODE ANN. § 365-101 (Supp. 1985); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 1408 (Vernon 1978 & Supp.1985); UTAH CODE ANN.
§30-3-5 (Supp. 1985); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, §758 (Supp. 1985); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 110
(1964); VA. CODE § 20-74 (1983); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.09.170 (Supp. 1985); W.VA. CODE § 482-16 (Supp. 1985); WiS. STAT. § 767.32 (Supp. 1984); Wyo. STAT. § 20-2-116 (1977).
217. BLAKESLEY, WARDLE AND PARKER, FAMILY LAW IN THE UNITED STATES, Ch. 29, § 29.09
(1987).
218. Id.
219. 754 F.2d 902, 906 (1 th Cir. 1985).
220. Id. at 906.
221. 724 F.2d 681, 682-83 (8th Cir. 1984).
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consideration of the parties' present financial circumstances was irrelevant
in the dischargeability determination.222 The Harrellcourt reasoned that
Congress intended the federal courts to limit their inquiry to "whether
the obligation can legitimately be characterized as support, that is, whether
it is in the nature of support." 2 23
Limited to their facts, these decisions are sound in light of the fact that
accrued spousal and child support obligations are generally not modified
by state courts. 224 However, a strong argument can be made that, with
respect to future spousal and child support obligations, an examination
of the parties' present financial circumstances is appropriate.
Bankruptcy courts and state courts have concurrent jurisdiction to determine the dischargeability of a family support obligation under section
523(a)(5).225. Therefore, it is not outside the realm of possibility or propriety that the parties' present financial circumstances will be examined
by a state court where the state court has been requested to determine
the dischargeability of a future obligation. The present financial situation
of the parties might be considered by the state court in the determination
of whether the obligation continues to function as support and is thus in
the nature of support or, more directly perhaps, if the debtor, opposing
a determination of nondischargeability, also requests a modification of
the state court decree.
If, instead, the matter comes to a head in the bankruptcy court and the
court refuses to consider the parties' present pecuniary circumstances in
the dischargeability determination, the debtor will be forced to litigate a
second time in state court. When one considers the "fresh start" policy
of the Bankruptcy Code, the expenses likely to be incurred by litigating
for a second time in state court, and the certainty that Congress intended
to prevent the discharge of obligations truly necessary for the support of
the ex-spouse and children of the debtor, it is appropriate for the bankruptcy court to consider the present financial circumstances of the parties
in the context of the discharge of future obligations. Doing so will not
necessarily favor the debtor over the recipient spouse since a discharge
of the debtor's other obligations may result in an improvement of the
debtor's financial circumstances and, thus, the debtor's ability to pay
future support.226
This position finds support in a Sixth Circuit case in which the court
has held that an inquiry into the parties' present financial circumstances
222. Id. at 683; Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906.
223. Harrell, 754 F.2d at 906.
224. See supra note 216.
225. See II U.S.C. § 523(c); In re Aldrich, 34 Bankr. 776, 780 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1983); In re
Mattern, 33 Bankr. 566, 568 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1983).
226. Hopkins v. Hopkins, 487 A.2d 500 (1985).
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was required in the determination of whether a current and continuing
obligation is a nondischargeable support obligation.227 The court expressly
confined its holding to future obligations. The court noted: "There has
been no claim that [the debtor was] in arrears on past payments due under
this obligation. The dischargeability of such unpaid past liabilities requires
an analysis distinct from consideration of whether the continuing obligation to hold harmless may be discharged.22 Subsequent cases adopting
this approach have so limited their consideration to the parties' present
financial circumstances.229

C. Hold HarmlessAgreements
Not all support obligations require the periodic payment of money
directly to the former spouse or child. However, the statutory language
of the family support exception to discharge appears to require that a
debt must be owed to the spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor,
rather than to a third party, to be nondischargeable as a support obligation. 230 As a result, the courts have struggled with the issue of whether
the debtor's obligation to pay a debt jointly incurred during marriage for
which the debtor has agreed to hold the former spouse harmless is dischargeable despite the fact that it is in the nature of support.231
The legislative history regarding this question is conflicting. At one
point it indicates that to be nondischargeable, a support obligation must
be payable directly to the former spouse. 32 At another point, it indicates
that no such requirement exists in the case of hold harmless agreements .233
The majority of courts which have considered the question have adopted
227. In re Calhoun, 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).
228. Id. at 1109 n.9.
229. See, e.g., Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. at 646; Ploski, 44 Bankr. at 913; Elder, 48 Bankr. 414;
In re Wright, 51 Bankr. 630 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).
230. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(B) provides in part: "A discharge ... does not discharge an individual
debtor from any debt-to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor ...."
231. See, e.g., Dirks, 15 Bankr. at 780-81 (hold harmless obligation dischargeable in bankruptcy
because such an agreement amounts to an assignment of support under section 523(a)(5)(Al).
232. The legislative history provides:
Paragraph (5) excepts from discharge debts to a spouse, former spouse, or child
of the debtor for alimony to, maintenance for, or support of, the spouse or
child. This language, in combination with the repeal of section 456(b) of the
Social Security Act (43 U.S.C. § 656(b)) by section 327 of the bill, will apply
to make nondischargeable only alimony, maintenance, or support owed directly
to a spouse or dependent (emphasis supplied).
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprintedin 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEws 5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865.
233.
This provision will, however, make nondischargeable any debts resulting from
an agreement by the debtor to hold the debtor's spouse harmless on joint debts,
to the extent that the agreement is in payment of alimony, maintenance, or
support of the spouse, as determined under bankruptcy law considerations that
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the better view that if the obligation is in the nature of support, it need
not be payable directly to the spouse, former spouse, or child of the
debtor to constitute a nondischargeable debt.23" Naturally, the obligation
is dischargeable if it is in the nature of a property settlement.235 Under
one of the approaches used in determining whether the hold harmless
obligation is in the nature of support, the courts analyze the obligation
as they do any other obligation owed directly to the spouse or child under
the family support exception, such as by examining the intentions of the
parties and the family court in creating the obligation,236 the debtor's
ability to pay,"' or factors such as whether the obligation terminates on
the death or remarriage of the former spouse."' In contrast, the Sixth
Circuit articulated an elaborate federal standard against which to evaluate
purposes of the family support exception
hold harmless agreements for2 39
to discharge in In re Calhoun. The Sixth Circuit's standard requires an
are similar to considerations of whether a particular agreement to pay money
to a spouse is actually alimony or a property settlement.
H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 364, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEwS 5963, 6320; S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG.
& ADMIN. NEWS 5787, 5865.

234. Calhoun, 715 F.2d at 1106-07 (payments in the nature of support need not be made directly
to the spouse or dependent to be nondischargeable); Williams, 703 F.2d at 1057 (debts payable to
third parties can be nondischargeable depending on whether the particular debt is determined to be
a support obligation or part of a property settlement); Maitlen, 658 F.2d at 468-69 (obligation to
make mortgage payments was a nondischargeable debt because termination of the obligation upon
death or remarriage of the spouse was an indication that the obligation was support rather than a
division of property); In re Coil, 680 F.2d 1170 (7th Cir. 1982) (promise to hold spouse harmless
for debts incurred during marriage was not dischargeable because the facts indicated the promise
was intended to be support); In re Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009, 1013-14 (S.D. Ga. 1984) (husband's
agreement to pay his wife's attorney's fees arising under a separation agreement is not dischargeable
even though payable to a third party); Ploski, 44 Bankr. at 914 (obligation to pay mortgage on the
family home under a divorce decree was not dischargeable where the family home was given to the
ex-wife for the necessary shelter of herself and her child); Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. at 648-49 (a
mortgage payment obligation was not dischargeable merely because the payments were not made
directly to the spouse, but where such obligation is to continue even after the need for support
terminates it is an indication that the obligation is a division of property rather than support, and
therefore, dischargeable).
235. Stout, 691 F.2d at 861 (obligation of debtor to hold former wife harmless for a loan was
dischargeable because the hold harmless clause was included in order to "equalize the division of
property"); In re Battaglia, 44 Bankr. 420, 421 (Bankr. D. Del. 1984) (obligation to pay marital
debts was dischargeable because the debtor assumed the obligation in return for the wife's interest
in the family home rather than to enable his wife to support herself); In re Hackworth, 27 Bankr.
638, 639 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982) (obligation arising from the assumption of liability for a loan
pursuant to a property settlement was dischargeable even though discharge transferred liability to
the ex-wife).
236. Coil, 680 F.2d 1170 (hold harmless obligation was nondischargeable because it was intended
to serve as support).
237. Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. 641 (if an obligation substantially exceeds the debtor's ability to pay,
the amount of the obligation which exceeds that ability should not be characterized as support).
238. Ploski, 44 Bankr. 911 (most pertinent question as to the nature of the obligation was whether
it terminated upon the death or remarriage of the benefited spouse).
239. 715 F.2d 1103 (6th Cir. 1983).

Winter 19871

STRANGE BEDFELLOWS

analysis of 1) the parties' intention to create a support obligation, 2) the
effectiveness of the obligation in providing support, and 3) the financial
circumstances of the parties.
The initial inquiry is devoted to ascertaining whether either the state
court or the parties intended to provide support through the hold harmless
agreement. If not, the obligation is dischargeable and the inquiry at an
end."40 Proof of intent to provide support may be found in any relevant
evidence, including that evidence generally considered by state courts in
"'
determining whether to award support. 24
The next issue to be addressed is whether the hold harmless agreement
has the effect of providing support. If discharging the obligation would
not negatively affect the former spouse's ability to sustain daily needs,
it should be discharged.242 If its discharge would negatively affect the
dependent spouse's ability to sustain daily needs, the obligation is in the
nature of support.24 3
Finally, to hold that the obligation is fully nondischargeable, the court
must determine that the amount of support represented by the agreement
to pay the joint debt is "not so excessive that it is manifestly unreasonable
under traditional concepts of support. ,244 In this regard, the debtor's past
and present ability to pay the obligation is considered as well as the
relative earning powers of the parties, their financial status, prior work
experiences or abilities, and other traditional state law factors relevant to
a decision to place a reasonable limit on support. 245 The amount by which
the obligation exceeds the reasonable limit of support should be discharged. To the extent that the obligation is within the reasonable limit
of support, it should be deemed to be in the nature of support and held
to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy. 2"
D. Obligations Owed to Attorneys and Other Third Parties
State court orders for spousal and child support take many forms. The
debtor is frequently ordered to pay the ex-spouse's attorney's fees incurred
in obtaining the divorce or custody decree.247 'The state court often orders
the debtor to pay family obligations, such as the ex-spouse's or children's
240. Id. at 1109. It also appears that there must be a recognized state law duty of support which
may be expressed or satisfied in whole or in part through a hold harmless agreement. Id.at 1107.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 1110.
245. Id.
246. Id.
247. See, e.g., Spong, 661 F.2d at 9 (debtor's obligation to pay wife's attorney's fees in connection
with dissolution proceeding was a debt for alimony and nondischargeable).
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medical and educational expenses, which will arise in the future.24 Finally, the family court regularly orders the debtor to pay debts incurred
jointly by the parties during the marriage, or by the ex-spouse alone.
However, the court does not always include a hold harmless or indemnity
provision in its order. 49 As has already been observed, the legislative
history of the family support exception regarding the dischargeability of
support debts payable to third parties is conflicting.25° Under a strict
statutory interpretation, 25' adopted only by a small minority of courts,
such obligations are arguably dischargeable even if they are in the nature
of spousal or child support since they are not owed to or payable directly
to the former spouse or child.252 In addition, the support obligation can
be viewed as having been assigned to a third party (the creditor) and, as
a result, is transformed into a dischargeable obligation. 253 However, neither approach to the family support exception has been embraced by the
overwhelming majority of courts facing the issue.25 4
If a literal interpretation of the Code's requirement that the debt must
be owed to a spouse, former spouse, or child of a debtor to be nondis248. See, e.g., Bedingfield, 42 Bankr. at 643 (state court dissolution decree required husband to
pay wife's law school expenses, children's educational expenses through college and a graduate
degree, and medical and dental expenses of the children).
249. See, e.g., Maiden, 658 F.2d at 467 (debtor ordered to pay mortgage on home but not to
hold ex-spouse harmles for its payment); Knight, 29 Bankr. at 750 (debtor ordered to pay joint credit
card obligations but not to hold ex-spouse harmless for their payment).
250. A joint statement issued by the Senate and House of Representatives shortly before Congress
passed the 1978 Bankruptcy Code states in part:
If the debtor has assumed an obligation of the debtor's spouse to a third party
in connection with a separation agreement, property settlement agreement, or
divorce proceeding, such debt is dischargeable to the extent that payment of
the debt by the debtor is not actually in the nature of alimony, maintenance,
or support of debtor's spouse, former spouse, or child.
124 CONG. REC. H 1, 096 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 1978) statement of Rep. Edwards); 124 CONG. REC.
S17, 412 (daily ed. Oct. 6, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
251. The author is mindful of the words of Judge Learned Hand: "There is no surer way to
misread any document than to read it literally; in every interpretation we must pass between Scylla
and Charybdis; and I certainly do not wish to add to the barrels of ink that have been spent in
logging the route." Guiseppi v. Walling, 144 F.2d 608, 624 (2d Cir. 1944) (Hand, J. concurring),
affd, 324 U.S. 193 (1945).
252. See, e.g., Dirks, 15 Bankr. 775 (debts to third parties which were intended for support were
discharged because exceptions to discharge must be narrowly interpreted so as not to undercut the
"fresh start" policy); In re Daiker, 5 Bankr. 348 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1980) (debts owed to Employees
Credit Union, Master Charge, and the medical center were dischargeable because the payments were
not made directly to former spouse).
253. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5)(A) (1982); See, e.g., Dirks, 15 Bankr. at 779 (payment of debt to
third party was intended as support, but under § 523(a)(5)(A), the debt was assigned and payable
to another entity and thus dischargeable).
254. Thus, critics of the bankruptcy laws have less reason to embrace the belief of Mr. Bumble
that "the law is a ass, a idiot." CHARLES DICKENS, OLIVER TwiST.
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chargeable is adopted, a ritualistic arrangement whereby the debtor funnels the payments through the spouse who in turn pays the creditor would
be necessary to avoid discharge of the obligation.255 As a result, the
majority of courts faced with the question have adopted the better view
that Congress did not intend support obligations to be discharged even
though payable to the ex-spouse's attorney 256 or to a third party as a result
of a debt incurred either during the marriage257 or after the marriage was
dissolved. 258 The obligation need not be payable to the debtor's former
spouse or child, but its payment must be for their benefit in order for it
to be a nondischargeable debt. 259 Attorneys to whom such obligations are
owed have sufficient standing to object to the debtor's discharge of the
obligation.2 Arguments that a support obligation payable to a third person
transformed a nondischargeable obligation into a dischargeable debt be255. Cf. In re Linn, 38 Bankr. 762, 763 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1984) (debtor's spouse not liable on
obligation and, therefore, debt discharged even though in the nature of support).
256. Williams, 703 F.2d at 1057 (husband's obligation to pay wife's attorney's fees arising out
of divorce proceeding was support and, therefore, nondischargeable); Spong, 661 F.2d at 9-10
(obligation to pay wife's legal bills in connection with divorce was in the nature of alimony and
support); In re Gwinn, 20 Bankr. 233, 234 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982) (attorney fees awarded in postdivorce proceeding involving child support and custody and spousal support were not dischargeable);
Holt, 40 Bankr. at 1013 (award of attorney's fees may be essential to spouse's ability to sue or
defend a matrimonial action and, therefore, are in the nature of support and nondischargeable); In
re Tessler, 44 Bankr. 786, 787-88 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1984) (debtor's obligation to pay ex-wife's
attorney's fees as part of his responsibility to provide child and spousal support was not dischargeable);
In re Romeo, 16 Bankr. 531, 536 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1981) (counsel fees equated with alimony because
they cut expenses in litigating a matrimonial issue and put the spouses on equal footing to litigate).
257. Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009 (mortgage payments payable directly to mortgagee and intended as
child support were not dischargeable); In re Rich, 40 Bankr. 92, 94 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1984) (obligation
to pay unsecured home improvement loan obtained during marriage was not dischargeable); Altavilla,
40 Bankr. at 942 (obligation to pay real estate taxes was intended to provide support for wife until
the real estate could be sold and was not dischargeable).
258. Boyle, 724 F.2d at 683 (8th Cir. 1984) (debtor's agreement to pay sons' college expenses
as they came due was in the nature of support and not dischargeable); Holt, 40 Bankr. 1009 (a
nondischargeable "debt" created by a separation agreement is an undertaking of a former spouse to
pay past or future obligations of the other spouse); In re Breaux, 8 Bankr. 218, 220 (Bankr. W.D.
La. 1981) (obligation, created by divorce decree a month and a half before the debtor's child's birth,
to pay debts incurred in the birth of debtor's child was not dischargeable).
259. Stranathan v. Stowell, 15 Bankr. 223, 226 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1981) (payments to third parties
which are determined to be in the nature of support will not be dischargeable if the nonpaying spouse
will receive any benefit from the payment of the debt); Holt, 40 Bankr. at 1012 (in determining the
nature of a debt the court is to consider whether the debt was: (1) in connection with dissolution
proceedings, (2) actually in the nature of support, and (3) benefits the debtor's spouse or child);
Tessler, 44 Bankr. at 788 (debt owed to ex-wife's attorney not dischargeable where intended as
alimony or support and the ex-wife received a present benefit from the payment of the debt).
260. Gwinn, 20 Bankr. at 234-35 (attorney successfully brought action to determine dischargeability of attorney's fees awarded to debtor's ex-wife); In re Whitman, 29 Bankr. 362, 363 (Bankr.
D.R.I. 1983) (debtor's wife's attorney had standing to object to the dischargeability of the debt for
attorney's fees).
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cause it was assigned to a third party in contravention of section 523(a)(5)(A)
have also been unsuccessful. 26'
E. Debtor's Spouse, Former Spouse, or Child
Apart from the questions raised in the event that support obligations
are payable to third parties, the statutory language of the support exception
which states that "a discharge . . . does not discharge 26 2 any support
debt "to a spouse, former spouse, or child of the debtor ' 263 raises the
question of which persons qualify as a child or spouse of the debtor.
Support obligations owed to both legitimate 264 and illegitimate 265 children
are nondischargeable in bankruptcy if the obligations arose in connection
with a separation or property settlement agreement, a divorce decree, an
order of a court of record, or a determination made in accordance with
State or territorial law by a governmental unit.266
Congress' choice of the word "spouse "267 is significant since, under
the former Bankruptcy Act, the family support exception excepted from
discharge debts for alimony, maintenance, and support "of wife or child. 268
Certainly, a former husband or husband of the debtor to whom a support
obligation is owed is now protected by the exception.
The extent to which Congress intended to extend the protections of the
family support exception to putative spouses and unmarried cohabitants
is unclear. Under the Bankruptcy Act, support obligations owed putative
spouses 269 and unmarried cohabitants 270 were held to be dischargeable.
These decisions stand for the proposition that under the Bankruptcy Act,
support agreements or orders arising in connection with judgments of
261. Spong, 661 F.2d at 10 (obligation to pay wife's attorney's fees was not dischargeable because
it was a third party beneficiary contract and not an assignment); Whitman, 29 Bankr. at 364 (fact
that attorney's fees were awarded directly to the attorney did not render the debt dischargeable as
being "assigned to another entity"); In re Kloss, 29 Bankr. 720, 721-22 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1983)
(obligation to pay attorney's fees was a third party beneficiary contract executed in favor of the
attorney and not an assignment). See infra notes 281-88 and accompanying text for a discussion of
§ 523(a)(5)(A) which, with several important exceptions, provides that support obligations which
have been assigned voluntarily, by operation of law, or otherwise, are dischargeable in bankruptcy.
262. 11 U.S.C. §523(a).
263. id. § 523(a)(5).
264. Id. See, e.g., Boyle, 724 F.2d 681 (father's promise to pay college expenses for his sons
incorporated into the divorce decree was in the nature of support and nondischargeable).
265. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5); See, e.g., In re Balthazor, 36 Bankr. 656 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1984)
(obligation to pay expenses arising out of the birth of debtor's illegitimate child was not dischargeable).
266. It U.S.C. § 523(a)(5). See infra notes 273-80 and accompanying text for a discussion of
the "in connection with" requirement of the family support exception to discharge.
267. "Spouse" is defined as a "wife or husband." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (5th ed. 1979).
268. Section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1979).
269. Norris v. Norris, 324 F.2d 826, 828-29 (9th Cir. 1963) (balance owed to putative spouse
under a support order was discharged where marriage was subsequently declared void).
270. In re Collis, 184 Misc. 717, 722, 53 N.Y.S.2d 316, 320 (S.Ct. 1945).
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annulment were not excepted from discharge. The courts reasoned that
there could be no nondischargeable support obligation because support
obligations could only be grounded on a valid marriage and the order of
annulment established that there was never a valid marriage."' A narrow
construction of the Code's support exception can also be supported.272
However, the better approach is to extend the support exception to
support obligations owed to a putative spouse where the debt arose in
connection with a property settlement agreement, an order of a court of
record such as an order of annulment, or a determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a governmental unit.273 This construction of the support exception not only reinforces the policy of parity
between putative spouses and validly married spouses in jurisdictions
which recognize the putative spouse's right to support, but also better
effectuates the policy behind the support exception itself: protecting creditor-dependents of the debtor.
With respect to unmarried cohabitants, the language of the support
exception is unlikely to withstand the weight of an interpretation excepting
from discharge support obligations arising out of a property settlement
agreement, order of a court of record, or determination by a governmental
275
unit.274 However, the logic of the court's decision in Marvin v. Marvin
might suggest that the protections of the exception should extend to
unmarried cohabitants.
F. The "In Connection With" Requirement
The language of the family support exception to discharge requires that
the debtor's obligation for alimony, maintenance, or support arise "in
connection with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or other order
271. Norris, 324 F.2d, 828-29 (support agreement discharged where marriage subsequently declared void); Collis, 184 Misc. at 722, 53 N.Y.S. 2d at 320 (obligation to pay lump sum as support
and maintenance discharged where marriage later annulled).
272. The argument would focus on the conventional definition of the word "spouse" as a validly
married husband or wife, the absence of legislative history to support an extension of the support
exception to a putative spouse, and the purposes of the amendments to this section which added the
language "or other order of a court of record, and the language "determination made in accordance
with State or territorial law by a governmental unit." For an additional discussion of these amendments
see infra notes 276-80 and accompanying text. In addition, a proponent of this construction would
point to other federal legislation concerning the putative spouse in order to demonstrate that when
Congress determines that the interests of the putative spouse deserve protection, it does so in explicit
terms. See, e.g., Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. §416 (h)(l)(B)(1982).
273. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (1982).
274. I1 U.S.C. § 302(a) allows the filing of a joint bankruptcy case by "an individual that may
be a debtor under such chapter and such individual's spouse." In In re Malone, 50 Bankr. 2, 3
(Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1985), the court held that unmarried cohabitants were precluded from filing a
joint petition under this section. See also In re Stuart, 31 Bankr. 18, 19 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983)
(when filing joint petition, each spouse must list assets, liabilities, and claimed exemptions separately,
and claims made against the debtor's estate must be filed separately).
275. 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, (1976).
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of a court of record, or determination made in accordance with State or
territorial law by a governmental unit, or property settlement agreement." 27 6 Therefore, the family support exception permits mere contractual agreements between the debtor and the debtor's spouse or child to
pay support to be discharged if those obligations were not ordered or
agreed to be paid or did not arise as a result of a separation agreement,
divorce decree, property settlement agreement, order of a court of record,
or determination made in accordance with State or territorial law by a
governmental unit.277 Furthermore, the in connection with requirement
often allows the debtor to discharge contractual liabilities owed third
parties which were incurred directly or indirectly for the purpose of
supporting the spouse or child. 78
The family support exception's statutory language, "or other order of
a court of record," and "determination made in accordance with State
or territorial law by a governmental unit,''279 were added by amendments
in 1984 and 1986 as a result of several decisions in which the in connection
with requirement was interpreted to allow the discharge of a support
obligation imposed in connection with adjudications of paternity. 280 Such
obligations are now clearly nondischargeable. The amendments have also
arguably expanded the scope of the section to prevent the discharge of
support obligations imposed in connection with an order of annulment,28'
and certainly prevent discharge of support orders by a welfare department
making the debtor's child a ward of the court, 82 or an interim court order
of support during a trial separation.283
G. The Assignment of Support
Under the family support exception as originally enacted, support obligations voluntarily or involuntarily assigned by the recipient spouse to
any entity, including governmental entities, for any reason, including
assignments made in order to obtain welfare or other relief, were dis276. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).
277. Leib v. Auerbach, 10 N.J. Super. 391, 76 A.2d 726 (1950).
278. In re Ostrander, 139 F. 592 (E.D.N.Y. 1905); Wintrode v. Connors, 67 Ohio App. 106, 35
N.E.2d 1018 (1941). The exception's requirement that the support obligation be owed to a spouse,
former spouse, or child of the debtor also supports the discharge of obligations owed third parties.
279. 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5).
280. Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333. (1984); Pub. L. 99-554, 100 Stat. 4934. (1986). See,
e.g., In re Marino, 29 Bankr. 797 (N.D. Ind, 1983); In re Fenstermacher, 31 Bankr. 77 (Bankr. D.
Neb. 1983), overruled, 47 Bankr. 258 (Bankr. D. Neb. 1985); In re Richards, 33 Bankr. 56 (Bankr.
D. Or. 1983), rev'd, 45 Bankr. 811 (D. Or. 1984).
281. See supra note 273 and accompanying text.
282. See Marino, 29 Bankr. at 800 (prior to 1984, statutory language allowed discharge of support
obligation which arose in connection with court order making debtor's son a ward of the court).
283. Richards, 33 Bankr. 56 (prior to 1984, statutory language allowed discharge of child support
debt which arose in connection with court order during trial separation).
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chargeable."8 4 A support obligation is assigned voluntarily when the oban intention to transfer all or even part of his
ligee objectively 2manifests
5
1
another.
to
rights
In 1981, Congress amended the Bankruptcy Code to prevent the discharge of alimony and support payments assigned to a state or county
welfare agency as required by the Social Security Act as a condition
precedent to receipt of Aid to Families with Dependent Children. 286 In
1984, Congress further amended the Code to prevent the discharge of
alimony and support obligations assigned to the federal government or
any state or any political subdivision thereof for any reason. 28 7 The 1984
amendment appears to make an alimony or support obligation assigned
to the clerk of court for purposes of collection nondischargeable. 8
Even after the 1984 amendment, if a debt for alimony or support is
assigned voluntarily or by operation of law to a nongovernmental entity
it is dischargeable. 2 9 A voluntary assignment of an overdue child support
obligation to an agency for purpose of collection allows the debt to be
discharged. 2 ° If a support obligation is assigned by operation of law to
the deceased creditor-spouse's personal representative, the obligation is
thereafter dischargeable in bankruptcy.'1
VI. THE LIABILITY OF THE DEBTOR AND THE DEBTOR'S
PROPERTY AFTER DISCHARGE
This section addresses the effect of a bankruptcy discharge on the
284. See, e.g., In re Glidden, 653 F.2d 85, 86-87 (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1143
(1982); In re Wilson, 29 Bankr. 254, 258 (Bankr. D. Kan. 1983); In re Davich, 27 Bankr. 888,
891 (Bankr. D. S.D. 1983).
285. In re Reichurdt, 27 Bankr. 751, 753 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983).
286. Pub. L. No. 97-35, § 764 (amending II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A)). Under § 402(a)(26) of the
Social Security Act, parents receiving Aid to Families with Dependent Children must assign to the
state any rights to support to which they are entitled and which have accrued at the time the assignment
is executed. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26) (1982). In making these assignments nondischargeable, Congress
indicated "that a parent's obligation to support his child is not one that should be allowed to be
discharged by filing for bankruptcy, and that a child support obligation assigned to a state as a
condition of AFDC eligibility should not be subject to termination that way." S. REP. No. 139, 97th
Cong., Ist Sess. 523, reprinted in 1981 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 396, 790; Matter of
Stovall, 721 F.2d 1133, 1135 (7th Cir. 1983) (neither support arrears nor right to collect support
due in the future are dischargeable as a result of this amendment).
287. Pub. L. No. 98-353, §454 (amending 11 U.S.C. §523(a)(5)(A)).
288. See II U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A). Prior to the 1984 amendment, several courts reached the
same result. See, e.g., In re Beggin, 19 Bankr. 759 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1982) (literal interpretation
of support exception prior to 1984 amendment rejected by court and support obligations assigned
to clerk of the court for collection purposes held nondischargeable because assignments were not
"true assignments"). Accord In re Sturgell, 7 Bankr. 59, 62-63 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1980) (administrative requirement for orderly collection of support); In re Gilbert, 10 Bankr. 462, 464 (Bankr.
N.D. Ind. 1981) (assignment to clerk of the court merely a convenience).
289. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5)(A).
290. Reichurdt, 27 Bankr. at 753-54.
291. In re Brunhoff, 4 Bankr. 381, 382 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1980).
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personal liability of the debtor and the liability of the debtor's property
for both dischargeable and nondischargeable pre-petition family obligations."' This matter isof particular significance when structuring support
and property settlement agreements with the spectre of bankruptcy in
mind and in assessing the effects of a bankruptcy discharge on the creditorspouse if the spectre materializes.
First, the debtor's personal liability and the liability of the debtor's
property after discharge can be examined by focusing on the nature of a
discharge in bankruptcy. Second, it is appropriate to ask whether the debt
in question has been discharged and whether the debt is secured or unsecured. Finally, the type of property from which the family creditor
seeks to satisfy the pre-petition obligation must be analyzed by asking
whether the property was exempted in the bankruptcy case or acquired
by the debtor after the case was filed.
It has been said that a discharge of an obligation in bankruptcy extinguishes the debtor's personal liability on the debt.293 However, this is a
somewhat misleading characterization since the Code simply does not
address the viability of the debt after it has been discharged.29 4 Instead,
when a debt is discharged in bankruptcy, the Code imposes a barrier, in
the form of an injunction, which prevents collection of the debt as a
personal liability of the debtor and voids any judgment against the debtor
to the extent that the judgment is a determination of the personal liability
of the debtor.295 Thus, the creditor spouse holding a dischargeable property
settlement obligation is prohibited from collecting the obligation as a
personal liability of the debtor. In contrast, the spousal or child support
claimant is not barred from this activity because such claims cannot be
discharged in bankruptcy.
What then, is the effect of a discharge on the ability of a secured
creditor, one who has a charge or interest in the debtor's property to
secure to payment of a debt (a lien), to reach the property securing its
claim? In general, the Code preserves valid and enforceable liens against
both exempt and nonexempt property and allows creditors who hold such
292. Because it is beyond the scope of this Article, neither the nature nor the limitations on the
family support creditor's state remedies against a debtor or the debtor's property where the debtor
has received a discharge in bankruptcy is addressed. Instead, this Article explores the creditor's
threshold ability to utilize state remedies to enforce the obligation as a result of a discharge in
bankruptcy.
293. H.R. REP.No. 595, 95th Cong., Ist Sess. 128, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN.
NEWS 5963, 6089.
294. Section 524(a) states that a discharge "voids any judgment" to the extent it is a "determination
of the personal liability of the debtor" and places an injunction on any act to collect the debt "as a
personal liability of the debtor." II U.S.C. § 524(a).
295. Id. § 524(a)(1)-(2).
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liens eventually to enforce their liens.296 Therefore, a property settlement
claimant (as well as other kinds of secured creditors) with a valid prepetition lien on the debtor's property may look to the property securing
the claim in satisfaction of the debt as long as the lien survives bankruptcy.297 If the value of the property is not sufficient to satisfy the obligation, the discharge prevents any further effort to collect the claim as
a personal liability of the debtor because the obligation is dischargeable
in bankruptcy. Naturally, a claimant holding a nondischargeable support
claim secured by a lien on the debtor's property can also look to the
debtor's property in satisfaction of the claim29 and, in addition, may
pursue the debt as a personal liability of the debtor because the support
obligation is a nondischargeable obligation.
We have seen that liens on both exempt and nonexempt property generally survive bankruptcy and may be enforced by a creditor holding the
lien after the underlying debt has been discharged. The situation of a
spousal or child support creditor whose nondischargeable claim is unsecured is similar. Such a creditor may not only pursue the debtor per-

sonally, but may also pursue the debtor's property acquired after bankruptcy
and, unlike most holders of nondischargeable debts, the debtor's property
exempted in the bankruptcy proceeding, if such property is otherwise

296. Id. §§506, 522(c); Hall, 752 F.2d 582; In re Weathers, 15 Bankr. 945 (Bankr. D. Kan.
1981). A "secured" creditor is one who has a charge or interest in property to secure payment of a
debt. Such a creditor's interest in property is called a "lien." 11 U.S.C. § 101(31). Under the
Bankruptcy Code, there are three types of liens and three corresponding types of secured creditors.
Id. § 506(a). A lien which arises by agreement between the debtor and creditor is called a security
interest. Id. § 101(43). A statutory lien is one which arises solely by force of a statute on specified
circumstances or conditions. Id. § 101(45). A mechanics lien is one example of a statutory lien. A
judicial lien is an interest in property obtained by judgment, levy, sequestration or other legal or
equitable process or proceeding. Id. § 101(30). There is arguably one additional type of secured
creditor under the Code. A creditor who owes a debt to the debtor is treated as a secured claimant
to the extent of the amount subject to setoff. Id. § 506(a).
297. A lien may not survive bankruptcy because the trustee or the debtor has successfully set it
aside under one of the avoidance sections of the Code. See infra notes 299-332 and accompanying
text for a discussion of some of the debtor's avoiding powers. In addition, under Section 506(d), a
lien will not survive bankruptcy to the extent that it does not secure an "allowed secured claim."
A claim cannot be an "allowed secured claim" unless there is value in the collateral supporting the
lien which secures the claim. A simple example illustrates the operation of Section 506(d). Assume
that the debtor owns a nonexempt parcel of real estate worth $20,000. Assume further that there
are three mortgages on the real estate each securing a debt in the amount of $10,000. The first,
($10,000) and second ($10,000) mortgage liens will survive bankruptcy because the liens are fully
supported by value ($20,000) in the real estate. The third mortgage lien will not survive bankruptcy
because it is not supported by any value in the real estate and is, therefore, not an allowed secured
claim. It is treated as an unsecured claim. II U.S.C. § 506(a).
298. The support claimant's lien will survive bankruptcy as long as it is supported by value in
the property which is subject to the lien, even though part of the claim for support is disallowed
under section 502(b)(5). Id. §§ 502(b)(5), 506(d)(1).
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liable for these obligations.299 An unsecured property settlement creditor
is not so fortunate. Since a property settlement obligation is dischargeable
and, in this example is unsecured, the creditor may not pursue either the
debtor or the debtor's property in an effort to satisfy the claim." Thus,
if the unsecured property settlement creditor receives anything on a claim
in a Chapter 7 case, it will result from the trustee's distribution of the
net sale proceeds of the debtor's nonexempt property.30 l
VII. THE DEBTOR'S AVOIDANCE OF LIENS ON EXEMPT PROPERTY
Section 522(f) of the Code allows the debtor to avoid certain liens on
exempt property to the extent the liens impair an exemption to which the
debtor would otherwise have been entitled. 3 2 After the lien is avoided,
it will not be valid in bankruptcy or thereafter. Judicial liens on any
exempt property may be avoided. 30 3 The debtor may also avoid nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests in any exempt household
goods, wearing apparel, and musical instruments held primarily for household, family, or personal use; 3" tools of the debtor's trade; 3 5 and professionally prescribed health aids.
Debtors frequently utilize section 522(f)(1) in attempting to avoid liens
granted in dissolution or separation proceedings to secure repayment of
familial obligations . 317 Consensual, nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interests in household goods, wearing apparel, tools of the trade,
and professionally prescribed health aids, granted to secure repayment
of a familial obligation, may also be set aside through the exercise of the
debtor's section 522(f)(2) avoiding power.30 8
Neither a waiver of the right to avoid an interest in exempt property
299. Id. §§ 522(c), 524.
300. Id. § 524.
301. Id. §§ 504, 507.
302. Id. § 522(f).
303. Id. § 522(f)(1).
304. Id. § 522(f)(2)(A).
305. Id. §522(f)(2)(B).
306. Id. §522(f)(2)(C).
307. See, e.g., Boyd v. Robinson, 741 F.2d 1112 (8th Cir. 1984) (application to marital residence);
In re Thomas, 32 Bankr. 11 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983) (lien on marital residence arising out of a dissolution
decree is not a judicial lien as required by § 522(f)(1) (1982).
308. Under certain circumstances, the debtor is authorized to claim as exempt property the trustee
has recovered through an exercise of one of his avoiding powers; under other circumstances, the
debtor may exercise the trustee's avoiding powers himself in order to increase the amount of property
which may be exempted. 11 U.S.C. § 522(g), (i). These sections are not as likely as § 522(f) to
involve attempts to avoid liens securing familial obligations and are, therefore, not discussed.
However, it is possible that the trustee (or the debtor) might attempt to avoid as preferential a
payment, a security interest, a mortgage, a lien, or an outright transfer of an interest in property
under a dissolution order or agreement (11 U.S.C. § 547), or as a fraudulent conveyance (II U.S.C.
§548). See, e.g., Gray v. Snyder, 704 F.2d 709 (4th Cir. 1983) (transfer of property from debtor
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nor a waiver of the right to claim property as exempt after an interest in
it has been avoided is enforceable. 3"
A. JudicialLien Avoidance and Family Obligations
Section 522(f)(1) of the Bankruptcy Code has been frequently invoked
by debtors seeking to set aside liens granted in dissolution or separation
decrees to secure repayment of a familial obligation.31oUnder this section,
the debtor may avoid the fixing of a judicial lien on an interest in property
to the extent the lien impairs an exemption to which the debtor would
otherwise have been entitled.3 1'
In order to set aside a judicial lien, three prerequisites must be met.
In resisting the debtor's effort to set aside a lien under this section, the
holder of a lien securing repayment of a family support obligation can
frequently argue that one or more of these prerequisites have not been
established.
3 12
First, the lien which the debtor seeks to avoid must be a judicial lien.
A lien is a charge against or interest in property to secure payment of a
debt or performance of an obligation.3 13 A judicial lien is a "lien obtained
by judgment, levy, sequestration, or other legal or equitable process or
proceeding." 314 The typical judgment lien is the kind of interest in property
which is acquired by a judgment creditor who obtains a writ of execution
or attachment, or properly dockets a judgment.3 15 Neither a statutory lien316
to ex-wife could be set aside as fraudulent conveyance if ex-wife's release of support rights did not
amount to reasonably equivalent value for the transfer). For a further discussion of these avoiding
powers and additional avoiding powers available to the debtor, see NORTON, supra note 204, at
§§ 26.43-.47; 30.01-.06; 32.01-31; 34.01-37.03 (1984).
309. 11 U.S.C. §522(e).
310. See, e.g., Boyd, 741 F.2d 1112 (attempt to set aside a lien on marital residence as "judicial
lien"); Williams, 38 Bankr. 224 (attempt to set aside divorced wife's lien against ex-husband's real
property). Section 522(f) provides:
Notwithstanding any waiver of exemptions, the debtor may avoid the fixing of
a lien on an interest of the debtor in property to the extent that such lien impairs
an exemption to which the debtor would have been entitled under subsection
(b) of this section, if such lien is (1) a judicial lien. ...
11 U.S.C. §522(f).
311. Id. § 522(f)(1); In re Brown, 734 F.2d 119, 125 (2d Cir. 1984) (even though a debtor lacks
equity in property, he may avoid a judicial lien if avoidance would allow him to enjoy an exemption).
312. 11 U.S.C. §522(f)(1).
313. Id. § 101(31).
314. Id. § 101(30).
315. See, e.g., In re Schnabel, 39 Bankr. 853 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1984) (ex-spouse recorded
judgment based on arrearages of alimony and support payments); In re Dionne, 40 Bankr. 137
(Bankr. D. R.I. 1984) (writ of attachment on debtor's real property); Marino, 39 Bankr. 830 (judgment
entered by state court arising from debtor's breach of an employment contract created a judicial lien
on debtor's automobile); In re Jaxtheimer, 36 Bankr. 786 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (recording of
final judgment and awarding of equitable lien on real property).
316. 11 U.S.C. § 101(45) defines statutory lien as a:
lien arising solely by force of a statute on specified circumstances or conditions,
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nor a lien acquired by virtue of a security agreement3" 7 are judicial liens
and thus may not be avoided under section 522(f)(1). An interest in
property arising out of an agreement to divide marital property which has
been subsequently embodied in a dissolution decree can be viewed as a
security interest rather than as a judicial lien because it was originally
consensual. Viewed as such, it cannot be avoided under this section.3" 8
Similarly, a property interest characterized as a statutory lien may not be
avoided under this section.3" 9
3 20
Second, the lien must be against an interest of the debtor in property.
Several courts have held that the lien did not attach to an interest of the
debtor in property where the debtor's former spouse was granted a lien
3 21
to secure repayment of the former spouse's equity in a marital asset.
Rather, these provisions in a divorce decree were viewed as simple declarations of the former spouse's pre-existing interest in the marital asset.
The property awarded the debtor in the divorce decree was viewed as
having been conveyed subject to a lien securing repayment of the nondebtor spouse's interest in the property. Therefore, the lien was not avoided
has
because section 522(f)(1) does not allow avoidance of a3 lien
22 which
attached prior to the debtor's acquisition of the property.
Third, the lien must impair an exemption to which the debtor would
otherwise be entitled. This means that there must be a statutory basis for
a claim of exemption of the type of property on which the debtor seeks
to avoid the lien. If the property could not be claimed as exempt, the
lien cannot be said to impair "an exemption to which the debtor would
or lien of distress for rent, whether or not statutory, but does not include security
interest or judicial lien, whether or not such interest or lien is provided by or
is dependent on a statute and whether or .not such interest or lien is made fully
effective by statute.
317. Id. § 101(43) defines security interest as a "lien created by agreement."
318. In re Wicks, 26 Bankr. 769, 771 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1982) (agreement transferring homestead
was the product of consent between the parties), aff'd sub. nom., In re Boyd, 31 Bankr. 591 (D.
Minn. 1983); Scott, 12 Bankr. at 617 (award of residence and money was the result of an agreement
after negotiation between spouses as to the fair and equitable division of jointly acquired property);
In re Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385, 387 (Bankr. W.D. Okla. 1981) (judicially sanctioned, consensual and
voluntary agreement between the parties with respect to the lien is not an "involuntary" judicial
lien within the meaning of section 522(f)(1)).
319. In re Lekvold, 18 Bankr. 663 (Bankr. D.N.M. 1982) (lien for back child support was a
statutory lien and could not be avoided as a judicial lien under section 522(f)(1)); In re Biddle, 31
Bankr. 449 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 1983) (lien on federal income tax return for back child support was
a statutory lien).
320. 11 U.S.C. §522(f).
321. See, e.g., Boyd, 741 F.2d at 1114, Williams, 38 Bankr. 224.
322. Williams, 38 Bankr. at 228; Thomas, 32 Bankr. at 12; Scott, 12 Bankr. at 615 (the intent
of Congress was that § 522(f) apply only to liens that are fixed after the debtor acquires the interest
in the item).
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have been entitled." 32' 3 Several courts have held that liens granted in
divorce decrees could not be avoided in the debtor's homestead because
the homestead could have been sold to satisfy the former spouse's lien.324
A few courts have taken a different approach to the issue of whether
a debtor may avoid a lien granted or created by virtue of a dissolution
decree. In one case, the court conditioned avoidance of a lien granted in
a dissolution decree on the debtor's full payment of the former spouse's
one-half interest in the equity of the homestead.325 In another, the court
allowed avoidance of a lien granted in a divorce decree to secure repayment of a property settlement agreement. However, the court correctly
suggested that avoiding a similar lien to secure repayment of spousal
support would be futile since exempt property remains liable for these
obligations.326 Finally, it has been held that the debtor has no interest in
exempt property which can be impaired within the meaning of this section
because the debtor holds the property in constructive trust for the former
spouse and any dependents.327 Under this approach, the debtor cannot
claim an exemption in such property because the debtor's and the estate's
sole interest in any property which is held in constructive trust is confined
to bare legal title. The beneficial interest in such property belongs to the
former spouse.328
B. The Avoidance of Nonpossessory, Nonpurchase-Money Security
Interests and Family Obligations
Section 522(f)(2) provides that the debtor may avoid a nonpossessory,
nonpurchase-money security interest in:
(A) household furnishings, household goods, wearing apparel, appliances, books, animals, crops, musical instruments, or jewelry
that are held primarily for the personal, family, or household
use of the debtor or a dependent of the debtor;
(B) implements, professional books, or tools of the trade of the
debtor or the trade of a dependent of the debtor; or
323. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f); In re Ranes, 31 Bankr. 70, 71 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1983) (even if attorney's
lien was a judicial lien it could not be avoided under § 522(f)(1) because alimony was not exempt
under Colorado law).
324. Adams, 29 Bankr. at 454; Scott, 12 Bankr. at 616-17. See also Williamson, 11 Bankr. at
795-96 (holding that because tenancy by entirety property was immune from process where judgment
creditor's lien was against only one spouse, debtor's exemption was not impaired and lien could
not be avoided).
325. In re Maness, 17 Bankr. 76, 77 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981).
326. In re Grimes, 46 Bankr. 84, 86-87 (Bankr. D. Md. 1985); 11 U.S.C. § 522(c).
327. Graham, 28 Bankr. at 931-32.
328. In re Shepard, 29 Bankr. 928, 932 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1983) (a trustee in bankruptcy succeeds
to the same title the debtor holds-bare legal title).
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(C) professionally prescribed health aids for the debtor or a dependent of the debtor to the extent such lien impairs an exemption
to which the debtor would otherwise have been entitled.329

Under this section, the security interest in certain items of the debtor's
exempt property which may be avoided is consensual. 3 ° A lien created
or granted in a property settlement agreement, even though incorporated
into a dissolution decree, has been held to be a security interest because
it was originally consensual. 33'
The debtor's section 522(f)(2) avoiding power must necessarily concern the family law lawyer when structuring marital dissolution settlement
agreements. Specifically, the cautious practitioner will secure family obligations with assets on which nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interests cannot be avoided if the items would otherwise be subject
to a claim of exemption in bankruptcy.
The debtor's avoidance power under this section does not extend to
possessory or purchase-money security interests. The former exclusion
protects a pawnbroker's lien and the latter the security interest of a lender
whose loan is used to acquire the item subject to the security interest.332
Some courts have held that a state may nullify the debtor's avoidance
power under this subsection by precluding the exemption of encumbered
property either directly 333 or indirectly."3 Others have suggested and adopted
the better view that state efforts to nullify the effect of section 522(f)(2)
fall victim to the Supremacy Clause and are invalid.335 In any event, it
is wise, where possible, to secure the repayment of family obligations in
329. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(a)-(c).
330. Id. § 101(43) defines security interest as a "lien created by an agreement."
331. Wicks, 26 Bankr. 769 (former husband's lien on debtor's homestead was consensual and
therefore a security interest), aff'd sub. nom., Boyd, 31 Bankr. 591; Scott, 12 Bankr. 613 (agreement
of debtor and former husband was a negotiated agreement respecting a division of jointly acquired
property); Dunn, 10 Bankr. 385 (voluntary property settlement agreement secured by a second lien
on real estate was not an involuntary judicial lien).
332. NORTON, supra note 204, at § 26.42 (1984). There is some dispute as to the type of loan
agreement covered by the exception for purchase-money security interests. However, the classic
purchase-money security interest is an interest acquired by a lender in an item upon a "single advance
made and used for the acquisition of [that] item." See id. n. 4 and the cases cited therein for a
discussion of this issue.
333. In re Allen, 725 F.2d 290 (5th Cir. 1984) (under § 522(b) a state may: (1) allow federal law
to be the sole remedy, (2) partially or wholly preclude the remedy available under 522(d), or (3)
allow an election between state and federal exemptions); In re McManus, 681 F.2d 353 (5th Cir.
1982) (Section 522(f) is tied to Section 522(b) which in turn rests on applicable state law in cases
in which the state has opted out).
334. In re Pine, 717 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1983) (creditor in Chapter 7 cases is entitled to retain
nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest under Tennessee and Georgia exemption statutes), cert denied 466 U.S. 928 (1984).
335. Hall, 752 E2d at 586-87; Maddox, 713 F.2d at 1530 (dictum); In re Dahdah, 20 Bankr.
665, 666 (Bankr. 9th Cir. 1982); In re McKelvey, 20 Bankr. 405, 408 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1982).
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items other than those in which a nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money
security interest may be avoided.
VIII. PROTECTING THE CREDITOR SPOUSE THROUGH
PRE-BANKRUPTCY PLANNING
The spectre of bankruptcy should haunt the prudent family law attorney
when drafting, negotiating, and structuring a dissolution order or marital
settlement agreement. By confronting the possibility of bankruptcy through
planning, the lawyer can better protect the interests of a client seeking a
divorce or a legal separation.
When representing a spouse entitled to receive spousal or child support,
the attorney should make a thorough record of the facts and circumstances
giving rise to this entitlement by including them in any court orders or
decrees or in any stipulations or agreements between the parties. Labeling
an obligation as support neither controls the characterization of the debt
for discharge purposes in bankruptcy, nor precludes an inquiry into the
nature of the obligation.336 However, it is one of the factors many courts
consider in determining whether the debt is a nondischargeable support
obligation or a dischargeable property settlement obligation.337 Thus, counsel
should not lightly agree to characterize what is truly a spousal support
obligation as a property settlement obligation in a court order or in a
written agreement between the parties. If the debtor has expressly waived
his right to a discharge of the obligation or implicitly waived it by virtue
of the characterization of the debt as support in an agreement between
the parties, the debt will nevertheless be discharged if it is not in the
nature of support. This is because neither a pre-bankruptcy waiver of the
right to discharge an otherwise nondischargeable debt, nor a waiver of
the right to a discharge is enforceable.338
With a few exceptions, the lien rights of secured creditors are preserved
in bankruptcy.3 39 An attorney representing a spouse to whom payments
will be made pursuant to a dissolution or separation order or agreement
should, whenever possible, obtain a mortgage or a security interest in
336. In re George, 15 Bankr. 247, 248-49 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981) (even though hold harmless
clause was labeled nondischargeable alimony, the provision was not in fact in the nature of alimony,
maintenance, or support and was dischargeable).
337. See supra note 200 and accompanying text.
338. 11 U.S.C. §§523(a)(1), 727(a)(10); In re Bisbach, 36 Bankr. 350, 352 (Bankr. W.D. Wis.
1984) (provision in divorce settlement to the effect that amounts which husband had agreed to pay
wife should be construed in "whatever manner necessary so as to be nondischargeable in bankruptcy"
was not enforceable); In re Crowder, 37 Bankr. 53, 55-56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984) (state court's
reliance on pre-bankruptcy waiver of rights in property settlement agreement was erroneous); George,
15 Bankr. at 248-49 (clause in separation agreement providing that the debtor's assumption of joint
debts was nondischargeable was not enforceable).
339. See supra notes 289-332 and accompanying text.
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the obligor's real or personal property to secure repayment of the obligation. This is particularly important if the debt is likely to be characterized as a dischargeable property settlement obligation rather than as a
nondischargeable debt for spousal or child support. Even though a secured
property settlement obligation is discharged, the lien which secures it,
and thus the creditor's in rem rights, will survive bankruptcy 3" unless
"
' When an unsecured
the lien itself is avoided or void in bankruptcy.34
property settlement obligation is discharged in bankruptcy, the creditor
spouse is effectively barred from collecting the debt.342
The debtor's personal liability for a nondischargeable unsecured debt
for spousal or child support will survive bankruptcy and can be collected
from property claimed as exempt in the bankruptcy estate as well as from
nonexempt property and property acquired by the debtor after bankruptcy.343 During the pendency of the bankruptcy proceeding, such claims
may be collected from property that is not property of the estate. 3" The
secured spousal or child support claimant has the foregoing rights as well
as any in rem rights which secure the obligation as long as the lien survives
bankruptcy.34 5 The advantage of securing a spousal or child support obligation is that, even if the obligation is mischaracterized as a dischargeable property settlement obligation, the creditor will usually retain lien
rights against the property which secures the obligation."
If it is possible to obtain a security interest or mortgage to secure an
obligation owed under a dissolution or separation order or agreement,
the assets to which the mortgage or security interest will attach must be
selected with an eye toward the possibility of bankruptcy. The attorney
representing the creditor-spouse should, if possible, obtain liens securing
the obligation in nonexempt property since the debtor's personal avoiding
powers may be exercised only with respect to exempt property.347 If all
available assets are exempt under the applicable exemption scheme, a
mortgage on real estate is preferable because the debtor's ability to avoid
consensual liens on exempt property extends primarily to household goods
and furnishings, tools of the trade, and health aids.348 Care should be
taken to avoid any unnecessary characterization of mortgages or security
340. See supra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
341. See supra generally notes 289-332 and accompanying text.
342. See supra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
343. Id.
344. 11 U.S.C. §362(b)(2).
345. See supra notes 289-98 and accompanying text.
346. For a discussion of the dischargeability of family obligations, see supra notes 167-288 and
accompanying text.
347. See supra notes 299-332 and accompanying text.
348. 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(2)(a)-(c).
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interests obtained in dissolution or separation proceedings as judicial liens
since the debtor may avoid judicial liens in any exempt property, including
real estate.349 Any mortgages or security interests obtained as a result of
such proceedings should be immediately recorded or perfected, because
if they are not properly recorded or perfected, they may be avoided under
other sections of the Bankruptcy Code.350
If securing an obligation is possible, the creditor-spouse's attorney
should select assets in which the debtor-spouse has equity. If a mortgage
or security interest is taken in an item in which there is no equity at the
time of bankruptcy, the lien will not survive bankruptcy.35 '
In most instances, the Bankruptcy Code preserves a creditor's right to
offset a debt owed by the creditor to the debtor by treating the creditor's
claim as a secured claim up to the value of the creditor's obligation to
the debtor.352 Therefore, if there are mutual debts between the former
spouse and the debtor and, under applicable nonbankruptcy law, the
former spouse has a right of setoff, the former spouse has at least a
partially secured claim. The claim should be filed as such with the bankruptcy court. A failure to do so could result in a later state court order
requiring the former spouse to pay the debtor after the discharge of the
debtor's obligation to the former spouse.353
An equitable lien theory can be used to the advantage of an otherwise
unsecured property settlement or support claimant. In bankruptcy, as
elsewhere, equitable liens are imposed to prevent unjust enrichment and
349. Id. §522(f)(1).
350. Id. §§ 522(g)-(), 544, 547. For a discussion of lien avoidance under these circumstances,
see NORTON, supra note 204, at H 26.43-26.47, 30.03-30.06, 32.01-32.31.
351. 1i U.S.C. §506(d). See supra note 294 and accompanying text for a further discussion of
section 506(d).
352. 11 U.S.C. 8H 506(a), 553. The creditor's setoff rights are preserved except where:
(1) the claim of such creditor against the debtor is disallowed other than under
§ 502(b)(3) of this title;
(2) such claim was transferred, by an entity other than the debtor, to such
creditor(A) after the commencement of the case; or
(B)(i) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition; and
(3) the debt owed to the debtor by such creditor was incurred by such creditor(A) after 90 days before the date of the filing of the petition;
(B) while the debtor was insolvent; and
(C) for the purpose of obtaining a right of setoff against the debtor.
Id. § 553(a).
353. In re Marriage of Williams, 157 Cal. App. 3d 1215, 1222, 203 Cal.Rptr. 909, 913 (1984)
(where husband failed to appear in ex-wife's bankruptcy proceeding in order to preserve right to
offset, that offset could not be used to revive, in a state court proceeding, a debt already discharged
in bankruptcy and, as a result, husband remained liable to wife). For a discussion of the use of
setoff in the context of dischargeable property settlement obligations, see Bailey, 20 Bankr. at 91112.
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to enforce the equitable right to have a particular piece of property applied
to the payment of a specific debt.354 Equitable liens have been imposed
by the bankruptcy court in favor of creditor-spouses whose claims against
the debtor were held to be dischargeable property settlement obligations
both where the divorce decree specified certain property as the source of
the payment of the obligation,355 and where it did not do so.356
XII. CONCLUSION
Congress attempted to forge an alliance between bankruptcy and family
law to facilitate both the fresh start policy of the Bankruptcy Code and
the policy of awarding spousal and child support by creating an exception
to the automatic stay for the collection of support and an exception to
discharge for support obligations. The extent to which Congress was
successful in accommodating the important interests which both policies
seek to promote is questionable in light of the narrow construction given
the automatic stay exception by many courts and the inherent possibility
of mischaracterization of a nondischargeable support award as a dischargeable property settlement obligation. Nevertheless, should the prospect of bankruptcy materialize, there is much that can be done to protect
the interests of a support or property settlement claimant. Attention to
the possibility of bankruptcy at the time support or property settlement
agreements are drafted can blunt the hegemony of bankruptcy in the
alliance between bankruptcy and family law.

354. Caldwell v. Armstrong, 342 F.2d 485, 490 (10th Cir. 1965) (definition of equitable lien),
161 (1936).
355. Caldwell, 342 F.2d 485 (divorce award gave ex-wife an equitable lien on endowment policy
proceeds); In re Thumm, 2 Bankr. Ct. Dec. 1347 (Bankr. E.D. Wis. 1967).
356. Bailey, 20 Bankr. 906 (former wife had equitable lien on debtor's property to secure dischargeable divorce award).
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